Looking back at 50 years of U.S. Philanthropy by Katz, Stanley N. & Soskis, Benjamin
www.ssoar.info
Looking back at 50 years of U.S. Philanthropy
Katz, Stanley N.; Soskis, Benjamin
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Katz, S. N., & Soskis, B. (2018). Looking back at 50 years of U.S. Philanthropy. (Opuscula, 116). Berlin: Maecenata
Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56900-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0
MAECENATA INSTITUT
FÜR PHILANTHROPIE UND ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT
 
 
Stanley N. Katz and Benjamin Soskis
Looking back at 50 years of
U.S. Philanthropy  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
                 
                
            Opusculum Nr. 116
                   April 2018
Der Autor 
 
Dr. Stanley Katz is President Emeritus of the American Council of Learned Societies, the 
national humanities organization in the United States. His recent research focuses upon 
recent developments in American philanthropy, the relationship of civil society and 
constitutionalism to democracy, and upon the relationship of the United States to the 
international human rights regime. 
Dr. Benjamin Soskis is a research associate in the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy 
at the Urban Institute, where his work explores the intersection of historical inquiry with 
contemporary philanthropic practice. He is especially interested in the relationship 
between philanthropy and democratic norms and institutions. He is a frequently contributor 
to the Chronicle of Philanthropy. 
Das Maecenata Institut 
 
Das Maecenata Institut für Philanthropie und Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin wurde 1997 als 
unabhängige wissenschaftliche Einrichtung gegründet. Das Institut hat die Aufgabe, das 
Wissen über und das Verständnis für die Zivilgesellschaft und den sogenannten Dritten 
Sektor mit den Themenfeldern Bürgerschaftliches Engagement, Stiftungs- und 
Spendenwesen durch Forschung, akademische Lehre, Dokumentation und Information 
sowie den Austausch zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und Praxis zu fördern. Das Institut 
versteht sich als unabhängiger Think Tank. 
Das Institut ist eine nicht rechtsfähige Einrichtung der Maecenata Stiftung (München) und 
hat seinen Arbeitssitz in Berlin.  
Weitere Informationen unter: www.institut.maecenata.eu  
Die Reihe Opuscula 
 
Die Reihe Opuscula wird seit 2000 vom Maecenata Institut herausgegeben. Veröffentlicht 
werden kleinere Untersuchungen und Forschungsarbeiten sowie Arbeitsberichte aus 
Projekten des Instituts. Die Registrierung dieser in elektronischer Form erscheinenden 
Reihe unter der ISSN 1868-1840, sowie die Vergabe von Einzelkennungen (URNs) durch 
die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek sorgen für volle Zitierfähigkeit. Durch die Kooperation mit 
dem Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR) Projekt ist eine dauerhafte 
Verfügbarkeit aller Ausgaben mit fester URL-Adresse sichergestellt. Eine Übersicht der 
neuesten Exemplare ist auf der letzten Seite jeder Ausgabe zu finden. 
 
Die gesamte Reihe Opuscula finden Sie zum kostenlosen Download unter: 
http://www.opuscula.maecenata.eu  
Impressum 
 
Herausgeber 
MAECENATA Institut  
Rungestraße 17, D- 10179 Berlin, 
Tel: +49-30-28 38 79 09, 
Fax: +49-30-28 38 79 10, 
 
E-Mail: mi@maecenata.eu  
Website: www.maecenata.eu 
Redaktion: Markus Edlefsen  
 
ISSN (Web) 1868-1840
URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-56900-9
 
 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten! Nachdruck nur mit Genehmigung des Herausgebers. 
Dieses Werk bzw. Inhalt steht unter einer Creative Commons 3.0 Deutschland Lizenz. 
Die Beiträge geben ausschließlich die Meinung der Verfasserin bzw. des Verfassers 
wieder. 
 
Haftungsausschluss: Trotz sorgfältiger inhaltlicher Kontrolle übernimmt das  
Maecenata Institut keine Haftung für die Inhalte externer Links. 
Für den Inhalt verlinkter Seiten sind ausschließlich deren Betreiber verantwortlich. 
 
 
 
Maecenata Institut, Berlin 2018 
 
Content 
 
1. What’s New? Addressing the Question of Philanthropic Novelty ...................................................... 4 
2. The Center Did Not Hold: The Decline of the Philanthropic Establishment and the Increased 
Diversity of the Sector ............................................................................................................................. 6 
3. The Growth of the Philanthropic Sector and the Significance of Bigness ......................................... 10 
4. Philanthropy in an Age of Inequality ................................................................................................. 14 
5. Philanthropy and the Rise of the State ............................................................................................. 18 
6. Philanthropy in the Age of Entrepreneurship and Budgetary Austerity ........................................... 24 
7. Philanthropy and Education Reform: A Case Study .......................................................................... 29 
8. Philanthropy and the Market: The Rise of Strategic Philanthropy.................................................... 35 
9. New Entrepreneurial Variants: Venture Philanthropy and Philanthrocapitalism ............................. 41 
10. Sector-Wide Structures, Identity, and Knowledge .......................................................................... 45 
4 
 
1. What’s New? Addressing the Question of Philanthropic Novelty  
Fifty years have passed since the establishment of the William R. Hewlett Foundation (it 
became the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation in 1977). Of course, the world of 1966 was 
vastly different from that of 2016, but the chronological distance is amplified by the 
philanthropic sector’s tendency to celebrate novelty as a cardinal virtue. We can note the irony 
that such assertions of ‘‘New Philanthropy’’ are themselves hardy perennials in the sector, 
emerging every few decades for the last century. But it is also the case that such claims have 
grown more insistent in recent years. There is now a general sense, from both inside and 
outside the sector, that we inhabit a brave new era in giving, separated from the past by an 
increasingly wide gulf of attitude and practice. Within this context, where even the early 1990s 
can seem a far-off memory, the mid-1960s become practically prehistoric------a time when Bill 
Gates was just another middle-school student and a DAF was the diminutive of a Disney 
character.  
Yet such claims regarding the newness of the age are rarely the product of sustained historical 
reflection. Unexamined, they threaten to obscure as much as they reveal. Thinking more 
carefully about how philanthropy has developed over the last five decades forces us to 
consider both continuities and ruptures in the sector’s history. At what point does historical 
development cross the threshold of the novel? And what is gained, and what is lost, when we 
focus on novelty as an analytic category? The establishment of the Hewlett Foundation a half 
century ago serves as a useful reference point for such an inquiry. The event sits on various 
tectonic plates in 20th century philanthropy, straddling fault lines that divide old from new, 
forcing us to reconsider those temporal categories. 
On one hand, even in 1966, the plates had already begun to shift. Four contemporary 
developments that, in our assessment, can stake particular strong claims to representing the 
exceptionality of the present moment------the grandness of the scale of giving, the amplification 
of donor control, the increased diversification of the sector, and the turn toward policy as an 
instrument of social change------can each trace a lineage back through the founding of Hewlett 
and to the historical moment in which it was situated. The Hewlett Foundation, along with the 
David and Lucile Packard Foundation, were among a cohort of West Coast foundations that 
signaled the coastal culmination of a century-long geographic dispersion of philanthropy 
throughout the nation (and ultimately the world). Hewlett and Packard were also the first 
philanthropic foundations to emerge out of the new high-tech fortunes of the second half of the 
20th century. In this respect, they augured the future philanthropic institutions of Gates, 
Omidyar, and Zuckerberg, with all the ambition, entrepreneurialism, and increased private 
financial resources that they represent. William Hewlett’s active involvement with the 
foundation in the final decades of his life (during the institution’s initial ‘‘living room 
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philanthropy’’ period) distinguished him from the many other more detached donors of the age 
and anticipated the ‘‘Giving While Living’’ movement of the current moment.1 
Additionally, by the mid-1960s, a small but influential corps of foundations had sloughed off 
the conservatism of the previous decades and had begun to engage more aggressively with 
the federal government in order to shape public policy. Leverage was their byword then, even 
as it is for many now, and their programs led to increased public scrutiny and concerns about 
the legitimacy of philanthropy, much as the initiatives of some of today’s funders have. The 
echoes of the policy interventions of McGeorge Bundy’s Ford Foundation can still be heard in 
today’s press releases. The arguments of Bundy’s critics resonate today. Here precedents can 
serve as valuable signposts to long-term trends. But they can also become distractions in a 
study of philanthropic history by threatening to make the past too familiar. In this case, for 
instance, focusing on the more politically engaged foundations of the mid-1960s can obscure 
the fact that many more then were politically timid and quiescent.  
In fact, if in some ways 1966 seems like the beginning of an era that has not yet reached its 
terminus, in others, the Hewlett Foundation’s founding doesn’t look forward so much as back. 
It can claim as its kin the early Progressive Era foundations, with whom it shares the same 
institutional form. Furthermore, even when the foundations of the 1960s seemed to presage 
the philanthropic scene of the 21st century, with shared characteristics and preoccupations, 
the recent rise of mega-philanthropy raises interpretive questions of scale: When do 
differences in degree become differences in kind? When, how, and in what ways does bigness 
matter in our understanding of the sector?  
This question and the others asked by this paper prompt us to reflect more generally upon how 
we understand change over time in the sector. Philanthropy professionals are often so focused 
on measuring their impact on society that they can forget that philanthropy is as much an object 
as an agent of historical change. It is good to be reminded that much of what is considered 
novel in philanthropy is really a product of the broader political, economic, and social context 
in which philanthropy operates.  
How we approach that context also shapes our understanding of philanthropy. Historians are 
often instructed to be wary of narratives of progress (or of declension). This is certainly an 
important caution with respect to the story of philanthropy over the last half century, since such 
narratives could suggest a teleological direction to the march of history or could encourage 
complacency or resignation. But we shouldn’t be afraid to make judgments about recent 
developments within the sector, as long as we are clear about the assumptions that undergird 
them and modest about our interpretations of the evidence. We offer these reflections on what 
                                                          
1 Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Golden Donors: A New Anatomy of the Great Foundations (New York: Truman Talley 
Books, 1985), 22. 
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has changed in a half century of philanthropy since the founding of the Hewlett Foundation in 
the hope of bringing those assumptions further to light. 
 
2. The Center Did Not Hold: The Decline of the Philanthropic Establishment and 
the Increased Diversity of the Sector  
One challenge in comparing the philanthropic sector of today with that of a half century ago is 
that we know much more about the present than about the past (the product of a greatly 
enlarged research apparatus and spreading sector-wide norms of accountability and 
transparency, which will be discussed later in the paper). There are few reliable statistics 
available about the precise composition of the philanthropic sector in the mid-1960s. The idea 
of a cohesive sector as a subject of analysis had not yet been fully established, and few 
foundations voluntarily shared information about their grantmaking or governance.  
‘‘Nowhere does knowledge of foundations drift into folklore more easily than when number is 
discussed,’’ remarked the authors of the 1967 Foundation Directory, produced by the 
Foundation Library Center. Through questionnaires, personal inquiries, public records from the 
IRS and state regulatory agencies, published reports, and newspaper clippings, the directory 
did its best to install facts where myth and irresponsible guesswork reigned. It estimated there 
were about 18,000 foundations in 1966, although only 6,803 had assets of more than $200,000 
or made annual grants of more than $10,000. Combined, these foundations had approximately 
$19 billion in total assets and made $1.2 billion of grants out of national charitable giving totals 
of nearly $14 billion. Because so many foundations were ‘‘so negligible in terms of fixed assets 
or moneys currently distributed,’’ the directory concluded that ‘‘statistics on growth in numbers 
alone, even if accurately compiled, have little significance.’’ But from the heights of a half 
century, the significance of these statistics increases. In 2014, some 67,700 foundations held 
$831.6 billion in net assets and gave nearly $55 billion, while total charitable giving rose to its 
highest level ever, $358 billion.2 
Those figures can provide the basic bookends for the story of the development of the 
philanthropic sector over the last half century, one defined by the dynamics of growth and 
increased diversity. A focus on growth allows for a relatively straightforward narrative of 
expansion; a focus on diversity highlights how a single narrative has become more unstable 
and unruly, breaking down and branching out into multiple tributaries. Indeed, in many respects 
– geographically, racially, ethnically, and ideologically – the last half century in philanthropy 
                                                          
2 See also Warren Weaver, U.S. Philanthropic Foundations (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 57-66. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1972 (93rd ed.), 306; The Foundation Library 
Center, The Foundation Directory, ed. 3 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967), 8-9; 2014 statistics from the 
Foundation Center. 
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has been defined by a movement away from homogeneity. Any account of what is new and 
what has changed in philanthropy must incorporate this heterogeneity. For starters, 
foundations and the donors that create them are now dispersed much more widely throughout 
the nation. At mid-century, the nation’s largest foundations were clustered in the major cities 
of the East Coast, especially in New York, with outposts in the Great Lakes region and the 
upper Midwest. Only one of the largest foundations, The James Irvine Foundation, was 
headquartered on the West Coast and it did not begin a program of active grantmaking till the 
1960s. The geographic concentration in the mid-Atlantic region of the major foundations and 
the men who ran them was a frequent topic of the congressional investigations targeting 
foundations in the 1950s. The 1953 Cox Committee report, noting that most foundations were 
headquartered in the New York area and that most trustees lived nearby, prodded foundations 
to make ‘‘a sustained search for qualified individuals residing West of the Hudson River [to] 
assist the foundations to maintain the freshness of approach, flexibility, and breadth of vision 
for which they profess to strive.’’ In fact, as late as 1969, New York State contained a quarter 
of all foundations.3 
The establishment of the Hewlett Foundation, however, was evidence of philanthropy’s 
westward spread, tracking the growth of the economy more generally and continuing the 
development of the foundation as a fully national institution. By the 1970s, California could 
boast six of the nation’s largest grantmaking foundations; in 2014, it had more than 7,700 
foundations in all, 9 percent of the total, second only to New York, with 11 percent. But this 
phenomenon was not merely bi-coastal; over the last several decades, various regional 
constellations of both foundations and donors have dispersed throughout the country. By 1990, 
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas had nearly the same number of foundations, around five 
percent of the total. In 2014, the top 50 largest foundations were headquartered in 20 states, 
along with the District of Columbia; the South alone could claim more than a quarter of all 
foundations.4 
Why does this matter? Unlike a half century ago, when the grand tour of the philanthropic 
sector would have required just a handful of stops (Manhattan’s Century Club alone might have 
sufficed), now the itinerary would require at least a dozen, and probably more. The center, in 
other words, did not hold. The diffusion points to a broader development. As Inside 
Philanthropy’s David Callahan has recently remarked, we can no longer speak of a single 
philanthropy ‘‘establishment,’’ a tightly-bound network of individuals with a shared system of 
norms, viewpoints, and experiences who govern access and influence. There are now, instead, 
multiple ‘‘establishments’’ - Callahan notes the distinct philanthropic communities based 
                                                          
3 Nielsen, Golden Donors, 217; Joseph C. Kiger, Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 89.   
4 Nielsen, Golden Donors, 200; AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, Giving USA: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for 
the Year 1990, 36th ed. (Chicago, 1991), 78-79; 2014 data from the Foundation Center.   
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around the turn-of-the-century ‘‘legacy foundations,’’ around finance wealth in New York City, 
around high-tech wealth on the West Coast, along with a handful of other ‘‘robust local 
philanthropic ecosystems.’’ There are now more tightly bound virtual clusterings as well, affinity 
groups united by shared program areas and interests. In this decentralized system, notes 
Callahan, ‘‘No one is in charge.’’5 
The fragmentation of the mid-century establishment is one illustration of the movement toward 
heterogeneity within the sector. Another is the sector’s shifting demographics. Calls for the 
sector to become more diverse have been so persistent over the last few decades that it is 
easy to forget that, over the last half century, it has become more diverse. The sector has 
struggled with constructing a narrative that registers  - and even celebrates - these changes, 
and the slow, unsteady relinquishing of a patriarchal model of philanthropy in favor of a more 
representational one - without suggesting that these changes are sufficient.  
At mid-century, foundation leadership and staffs (such as there were, since the vast majority 
of foundations had no professional staff) reflected the white establishment. A 1956 survey 
noted that 7 percent of foundation trustees were women, but made no mention of race or 
ethnicity. In his 1972 study, Waldemar Nielsen reported that of the founders of the 33 large 
foundations he examined, none was Catholic and only one was Jewish. ‘‘The working 
atmosphere in most of the large foundations is genteel; Jews, blacks, and women (as 
professional employees) have not generally been permitted to intrude.’’  
Yet by that time, calls for greater diversity had begun to penetrate the gentility of the sector. In 
1971, Ford added its first woman trustee and other foundations such as the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Rockefeller and Gannett foundations made efforts to diversify as well. In 
1973, the Council on Foundations affirmed this as a sector-wide imperative, releasing a 
statement proclaiming that ‘‘Diversified boards and staffs will insure the sensitivity of 
foundations to the needs of segments of society who have often been denied adequate voice 
and representation.’’6 
In the following decades, women made the most impressive gains in the sector. Half a century 
ago, there were a few examples of women in leadership positions in the field, such as Edna 
McConnell Clark, who expertly guided her eponymous foundation in its first decade; before 
her, the example of Olivia Sage loomed larger still. These were, however, isolated, towering 
figures, with no movement coalescing around them. A study published in 1974 estimated that 
only 15 percent of foundation staff were women. But the place of women within the 
                                                          
5 David Callahan, ‘‘Is There a Philanthropy Establishment? And If So, Who’s in It?’’ Inside Philanthropy, January 
28, 2016, accessed online at http://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2016/1/28/is-there-a-philanthropy-
establishment-and-if-so-whos-in-it.html.   
6 Kiger, Philanthropic Foundations in the Twentieth Century, 92; Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 310, 324; Nielsen, Golden Donors, 415; Henry A. J. Ramos and Gabriel 
Kasper, ‘‘Latinos and Community Funds: A Comparative Overview and Assessment of Latino Philanthropic Self-
Help Initiatives,’’ in Nuevos Senderos: Reflections on Hispanics and Philanthropy, eds. Daina Campoamor, William 
A. Diaz, and Henry A. J. Ramos (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 1999), 141. 
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philanthropic sector tracked women’s entrance into the workforce more generally, and by the 
mid-1990s, women were overrepresented within the foundation sector at the staff level.  
Their representation in leadership positions also surged. A 1990 survey of 723 foundations 
conducted by the Council on Foundations reported that women made up 29 percent of the 
boards of trustees; 43 percent of the chief executives on whom information was available were 
women. The numbers continued to climb; in 2014, according to data compiled by the D5 
Coalition, 55 percent of foundation presidents were women (though among grantmakers with 
more than $1 billion in assets, the proportion fell to 28 percent).  
Perhaps just as significant was the development of women’s funding organizations that 
directed resources toward issues that affect women and girls. The largest of these, the 
Women’s Funding Network, was started in the mid-1980s and by 2000 could claim $200 million 
in assets. The last decade has also seen increased efforts to encourage wealthy women 
donors to direct giving to women’s causes, as with the Women Moving Millions initiative (whose 
members by 2016 had made more than $600 million in gifts), as well as campaigns by a 
number of high-profile philanthropists, most notably Melinda Gates and Susan Buffett, to 
designate women’s issues as a primary funding area. Although we lack sound data on how 
much philanthropy has recently been directly targeted to benefit women and girls, it is clear 
that the total still amounts to a relatively small percent of overall giving. But it is also clear that 
the prominence of women’s issues has grown considerably in the sector over the last half 
century, especially given the depths from which it had to climb; a report prepared for the 
Rockefeller-funded Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (the Filer 
Commission) estimated the proportion of total grantmaking directed to women’s issues as less 
than 0.2 percent for foundation grants made between 1972 and 1974. And the cause for this 
shift seems clear as well: women’s increased representation within the sector and within 
positions of power in the corporate and political realm more generally.7 
Racial and ethnic minorities have made slower representational gains within the sector. 
According to a 1991 study by Emmett Carson, for instance, 14 percent of foundation program 
staff were African-American, while only 5 percent were Hispanic. At the leadership level, the 
movement toward inclusiveness was equally laggard. Carson’s 1991 study reported that only 
14 percent of the members of foundation governing boards were people of color. And in 1994, 
                                                          
7 David Callahan, The Givers: Money, Power and Philanthropy in the New Gilded Age, 235, manuscript in authors’ 
possession; ‘‘How and Why Women Give: Current and Future Directions for Research on Women’s Philanthropy,’’ 
May 2015, Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, Women’s Philanthropy Institute; Kiger, Philanthropic Foundations in 
the Twentieth Century, 95; Council on Foundations, 2015 Grantmakers Salary and Benefits Report; Stephen Heintz, 
Robert Ross, and Luz Vega-Marquis, ‘‘Philanthropic Leadership Shouldn’t Still Look Like the Country-Club Set,’’ 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 11, 2016; Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, ‘‘Commentary on 
Commission Recommendations,’’ in Research Papers sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and 
Public Needs, vol I (Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, 1977), 58.   
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the Council on Foundations estimated that only 4 percent of foundation CEOs were men or 
women of color.8 
In the last two decades, levels of diversity have increased, then plateaued. According to a 2002 
report from the Joint Affinity Groups, the percentage of minorities on foundation staffs rose to 
20 percent by 1998. Using 2014 data collected by the Council on Foundations, the D5 Coalition 
reported that 12.7 percent of foundation program officers are black and 10.2 percent are Latino. 
Representation in leadership positions continues to lag. In its most recent report, the D5 
Coalition reports that ‘‘the proportion of CEOs of color has remained flat over the past five 
years, at 8 percent. The corresponding figure for senior executive staff is a tad more positive -
17 percent, compared to 14 percent five years ago - but there’s been a slight decline in program 
officers of color.’’ (Although analysis by the Center for Effective Philanthropy has also shown 
that these rates are higher at the largest foundations).9 
In explaining the results of a 2002 study that showed that women and minorities were still 
underrepresented on foundation boards, Emmett Carson, then the head of the Minneapolis 
Foundation, concluded, ‘‘What this shows us is that we haven’t made any real progress.’’ But 
what such results really show is how slippery ‘‘progress’’ can be as a means of describing 
historical change. A comparison of foundation boards of 1966 and of today would make clear 
that significant change has occurred in the direction of diversity. But the change is incomplete, 
nonlinear, and does not foreclose the possibility of reversal. Moreover, the decades-long 
challenge to the sector’s homogeneity continually undercuts any sense of culmination as new 
categories of inclusion, such as sexual orientation and disability, assert themselves and 
underscore the failings of the status quo. The emergence of alternative funding movements 
over the last several decades - women’s funds, Asian-American funds, Latino funds, African-
American funds, gay and lesbian funds - as well as of conservative movement philanthropy, 
have all signaled disappointment with the mainstream philanthropic establishment. But as it 
has diversified and fragmented, that establishment has become a less coherent negative 
reference point against which to measure ‘‘real progress.’’ 
 
3. The Growth of the Philanthropic Sector and the Significance of Bigness  
Alongside diversification, the other dynamic that has most clearly defined the philanthropic 
sector over the last half century has been growth, which also has not been uniformly distributed 
                                                          
8 Ramos and Kasper, ‘‘Latinos and Community Funds,’’ 141-142.   
9 Michael Anft, ‘‘Foundation Staffs Do Not Reflect Diversity of U.S. Population, Report Says,’’ Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, July 25, 2002; Stephen Heintz, Robert Ross, and Luz Vega-Marquis, ‘‘Philanthropic Leadership 
Shouldn’t Still Look Like the Country-Club Set,’’ Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 11, 2016; D5 Coalition report; 
‘‘African-American Foundation CEOs: A Look at the Leadership of the Largest Foundations,’’ Center For Effective 
Philanthropy, July 21, 2015, accessed online at http://effectivephilanthropy.org/african-american-foundation-ceos-
a-look-at-the-leadership-of-the-largest-foundations/. 
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or applied in a linear manner. Not long after the Hewlett Foundation’s emergence, the 
philanthropic sector began to experience relatively low levels of foundation creation and 
growth. The situation was the product of high inflation, stock market reverses, and increased 
government regulation, conditions that steered some donors into alternative forms of giving. 
Foundation creation and growth picked up in the 1990s, accelerating in the second half of the 
decade; it stagnated during the recession of the early 2000s, then rebounded before dipping 
during the Great Recession. More recently, the total number of foundations, total assets, and 
combined annual gifts have shot up again, so that all three totals now have surpassed their 
pre-recession peaks. Total giving by individuals has also crept back up so that it is approaching 
its pre-recession record level.10 
One constant amidst the foundation sector’s growth has been its top-heavy character; it has 
remained, over the last half century, in Waldemar Nielsen’s evocative phrase, ‘‘macro-
cephalic.’’ The quality of ‘‘bigness’’ has long defined - and occasionally troubled - philanthropy. 
In Nielsen’s first survey of the largest foundations, the Ford Foundation presided on top, with 
assets of $3.7 billion in 1968, four times as much as the next largest foundation - a total equal 
to one-third of the top 33 foundations and a sixth as large as the total assets from all of the 
sector’s 25,000 foundations. In the mid-1980s, even after having lost a third of its endowment’s 
value in the stock market during the recession of the previous decade, Ford was still more than 
twice as large the next on the list, the MacArthur Foundation. 
More generally, then and now, the foundation sector (like the nonprofit sector as a whole) is 
characterized by the dominance of a relatively small number of very large organizations (in 
relation to a very large number of smaller organizations). In 1968, the largest 33 foundations 
owned nearly half the total assets of the entire sector (more than $10 billion of $20.5 billion); 
according to Fortune, the top 7 percent of foundations controlled 90 percent of the assets. In 
the mid-1980s, those proportions remained nearly the same, even as the total assets 
ballooned.11 
Today, the Gates Foundation holds more than three times as much wealth as the next largest 
foundation (the Ford Foundation); its annual grantmaking is 3.5 times as high (a proportion 
that will likely continue well into the future, since the foundation must spend the annual 
contributions made by Warren Buffett within a year of receipt). The share of total assets held 
by the 50 largest foundations has dropped since the establishment of the Hewlett Foundation 
- as of 2014, that group held ‘‘only’’ nearly 30 percent of total assets - but this is largely the 
                                                          
10 Historical trends from the Foundation Center online; Giving USA 2015 report.   
11 On the other hand, research conducted by the Yale University Program on Non-Profit Organizations found that 
between 1962 and 1982, the relative asset share of the largest foundations did fall. In 1962, foundations with more 
than $25 million in assets made up 69 percent of all foundation assets; in 1982, the largest foundations (measured 
as those with more than $75 million, to account for inflation), held only 48 percent of total assets. Teresa Odendahl, 
‘‘Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An Overview,’’ in Teresa Odendahl, ed., America’s Wealthy and 
the Future of Foundations (Council on Foundations, 1987), 7; Nielsen, Big Foundations, 21-22, 24, 78; Nielsen, 
Golden Donors, 4, 7.   
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case because the class of ‘‘mega-foundations’’ has expanded, as discussed below. The 
concentration is still pronounced. 
If the top-heavy nature of the sector has remained relatively constant, the identities of those 
foundations at the top have not; the upper reaches of the sector have been especially prone 
to flux. When Waldemar Nielsen examined the largest foundations (those with more than $100 
million in assets) in 1968, he noted that only five were on a comparable list from three decades 
before. When he examined the largest group again in 1984 (now defined as those with more 
than $250 million in assets), he found that more than a third of his group from 1968 had fallen 
off the rankings. 
Today, an equivalent ranking of the top 36 foundations contains 21 names that did not appear 
on the 1985 list. The churning continues, accelerated by the introduction of a large cohort of 
newly established foundations. More than half of the top 30 largest foundations in 2014 were 
established or received the bulk of their funds since the establishment of the Hewlett 
Foundation; a third were established or received the bulk of their funds in the last two 
decades.12 
The entire field has in fact experienced something of an institutional baby boom over the last 
several decades. The number of foundations in the U.S. jumped 75 percent from 1990 to 2000, 
compared to an increase of 47 percent in the 1980s. According to a recent survey from the 
National Center for Family Philanthropy and the Urban Institute, family foundations created in 
the last 25 years make up nearly 70 percent of all existing family funds. According to figures 
from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Urban Institute, of 105,405 private 
foundations that have registered with the IRS as of August 2016, more than 81,000 were 
created since the 1990s (as measured by IRS ruling date), and they control nearly 56 percent 
of total assets. In other words, in the philanthropic sector, a disproportionality in chronology 
amplifies the disproportionality in size. The sector skews big and young.13 
It was only in recent decades, however, that the trends in bigness and newness aligned, and 
that the growth in large foundations kept pace with overall sector-wide expansion. In the two 
decades after Hewlett’s establishment, only six new foundations were formed with more than 
$100 million in assets. Of course, even when there were relatively few of them, these largest 
foundations - and the largest donations - still attracted a disproportionate amount of public 
scrutiny and media attention. In December 1955, for instance, in order to avoid penalties for 
excess accumulation that would kick in after an enormous sale of stock, the Ford Foundation 
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announced ‘‘the most massive single unloading of philanthropic resources ever known,’’ grants 
totaling more than $500 million to a mix of colleges, universities, hospitals, and medical 
schools, which far exceeded its total grantmaking over its first two decades. And in the early 
1970s, after the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation received securities worth more than $1 
billion from the estate of its founder and became the nation’s second largest foundation, 
commentators within the health sector worried that because of the gravitational pull of its 
massive resources, when the foundation developed a national program to address a particular 
problem, its position would almost instantly become conventional wisdom in the field. This has 
been precisely the apprehension that has attended the Gates Foundation’s status in the 
sector.14 
But such outsized institutions and gifts were not part of some broader trend; they were outliers, 
products largely of singular ‘‘dumping’’ exigencies. This is no longer the case with today’s 
systemic ‘‘mega-philanthropy.’’ Its bigness is bigger - and there is more of it. In the mid-1980s, 
only seven private grantmaking foundations had assets of $1 billion (17 in 2016 inflated-
adjusted dollars); in the mid-1990s, that number climbed to 16, with 164 others holding more 
than $100 million. By 2004, there were 49 billion-dollar foundations, and a decade later, more 
than 88. And along with mega-foundations, there has also been a surge in mega-gifts. In 1990, 
there was only a single gift of more than $100 million and 16 gifts of more than $10 million by 
living individuals (and five more by bequest). In 2000, just seven donors gave more than $100 
million and total giving of $17.6 million landed a donor on the Chronicle of Philanthropy list of 
top 50 donors. In 2015 (something of a down year for mega-gifts), according to the Chronicle 
of Philanthropy, 23 donors gave more than $100 million and it took gifts of $32.6 million to 
secure a spot on the top 50 list). In fact, over the last few decades, mega-gifts have come to 
represent an increasingly large share of total charitable giving, although the recession 
dampened that trend. Legal scholar Garry Jenkins tracked the increase of grants of over $5 
million and $10 million between 1997 and 2008 and found that it was proportionally higher than 
the increase in the total number of grants or in the total dollar value of all grants. ‘‘In 1997, 
grants of $5 million or more constituted only 9.9 percent of total grant dollars in the sample; by 
2008, that percentage had risen to 29.9 percent,’’ he notes. ‘‘This growth in the number and 
value of mega-grants, when compared to the substantially slower growth of the total number 
and value of all grants, tells us that grantmakers are directing relatively more resources to 
larger projects.’’15 
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4. Philanthropy in an Age of Inequality  
The growth of mega-philanthropy does reflect some factors endogenous to the sector: the 
grand ambitions and competitiveness of today’s donors, the contemporary attraction of the 
‘‘big bet.’’ But the strongest causal factors for the rise of mega-philanthropy are exogenous: 
Mega-philanthropy is a product of shifts in political economy over the last several decades that 
have concentrated wealth into the hands of a select few. When the Forbes 400 list of the 
wealthiest Americans debuted in 1982, it had just 13 billionaires. By 2006, there were 
extraneous billionaires who didn’t even make the cut-off. In fact, between 1984 and today, the 
combined assets of all those on the list increased by nearly 2,000 percent. A 2016 survey from 
Wealth-X confirmed this wealth explosion, counting 69,350 Americans with more than $30 
million in assets (a third of the world’s ultra-high-net worth population), a 20 percent increase 
from 2011; another survey concluded that the number of ultra-high net worth individuals 
worldwide jumped more than 60 percent from a decade ago.16 
In fact, these figures underscore one of the most striking difference between the present 
moment and half century ago. In the mid-1960s, the United States was enjoying a period of 
generally distributed economic growth, settled in the happy valley between the peaks of 
widening inequality that preceded the two great economic crises of the 1930s and the 2000s. 
In 1966, the top 0.1 percent of families controlled around 10 percent of the nation’s wealth; 
now that number has grown to around 22 percent, matching the levels of the pre-crash 1920s. 
The 1960s was a time of a relatively strong middle class and a relatively weak plutocracy (and, 
not coincidentally, of strong federated mass membership organizations). Over the following 
decades, the middle class shrank while the wealth controlled by the richest Americans swelled 
as they captured an increasingly large part of the nation’s economic growth. During economic 
expansion of 2002-2006, three-quarters of all income growth in the United States went to the 
top 1 percent of the population; 37 percent of the economic gains between 2009 and 2010 
went to the top .001 percent.  
Today’s philanthropy, and especially its mega-philanthropy, echoes and is implicated in today’s 
skewed economic distribution. Even when it is not directed to ‘‘big bets’’ for social change and 
instead channeled to traditional institutions - universities, hospitals, museums - such gifts 
underscore the power of a small elite to impose their preferences and priorities on the public 
and on private institutions. The gap between the wealthiest nonprofit institutions and the bulk 
of the sector widens. Some 28 percent of the $40 billion raised by America’s universities, for 
instance, went to the top 20 institutions with the largest endowments. In fact, as the 
Congressional Research Service recently reported, 74 percent of the $516 billion in total 
                                                          
16 Wealth-X, World Ultra Wealth Report Highlights 2015-2016, p. 9-10; Knight-Frank, Wealth Report 2016, p. 22; Darrell 
West, Billionaires: Reflections on the Upper Crust (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), 4; Callahan, Givers, 
19, 285.   
15 
 
endowment assets held by colleges and universities in 2014 was concentrated in just 11 
percent of those institutions. Such maldistribution highlights the gulf between the ultra-wealthy 
and the rest of us, which has become such a salient focus of contemporary political discourse. 
As the commercial success of Thomas Piketty’s recent scholarly works on the subject can 
attest, inequality has become a defining feature of how many now view the world.117 
Unsurprisingly, then, we have seen in recent years a return of the suspicion of philanthropy 
that dogged foundations in their earliest decades. That suspicion was a powerful force that the 
sector had to contend with for nearly all of the 20th century. There was a ‘‘brief balmy season 
at the closing decades of the century and at the opening of the new one’’ in which a largely 
celebratory attitude toward philanthropy prevailed, but this was a historical anomaly. Now, 
increasingly, foundations must contend again with questions of their fundamental legitimacy.  
Many have done so by engaging the issue of inequality itself. This emphasis is novel. From 
the earliest roots of modern philanthropy, the chasm between the classes has been a concern; 
Andrew Carnegie introduced his ‘‘The Gospel of Wealth’’ (1889), after all, by stating that 
maintaining ‘‘the ties of brotherhood’’ between the rich and poor was the ‘‘problem of the age.’’ 
But Carnegie did not argue this required philanthropy to dismantle inequality------which was, 
he considered, ‘‘not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the race.’’ Instead, 
the wealthy must focus their efforts on extending opportunity, providing ‘‘ladders upon which 
the aspiring can rise.’’ By the 1960s, however, philanthropy’s emphasis was not so much on 
inequality as on the paradox of ‘‘poverty amidst plenty.’’ Its work was governed by the 
assumption that the fundamental structures of the economy were sound, but that its blessings 
had not been adequately distributed.  
Within the last several decades, however, the attention of scholars and policymakers has 
focused on the problems posed by the very rich as well much as on those posed by the poor, 
so that questions of wealth distribution have come to the fore. The Ford Foundation’s recent 
grantmaking reorientation around inequality reflects this shift most prominently, but it is 
becoming a sector-wide preoccupation (so much so that some veterans of inequality research 
have begun to grumble about faddish entrants into the field). It is too early to tell if there will be 
long-term programmatic consequences associated with this shift, and whether a rhetorical 
focus on inequality will lead to a permanent reallocation of funds or changes in the 
demographic composition of the sector. But it has already cast a brighter light on the power 
and privileges of philanthropy in society.18 
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The inequality of this second Gilded Age has been fueled by the winner-take-all dynamics that 
have transformed both the old and new economy. The growth has been most spectacular in 
finance and the high-tech sector (though it’s been evident in real estate, retail, and media as 
well). In fact, according to the Wealth-X report, the wealth of more than 20 percent of the ultra-
high net worth individuals in the United States (with assets of $30 million or more) derived from 
the finance, banking, or investment industries, the highest of any sector. As we’ll see, finance 
and technology have provided many of the dominant tropes that have shaped thinking about 
philanthropy over the last decade - and have accounted for much of the largest gifts in recent 
years. 
This was not the case a half century ago. Of the fortunes which created the top 33 foundations 
studied by Waldemar Nielsen in 1984, only those associated with the Mellon family could be 
said to have stemmed from banking (although several other donors became involved in finance 
after making their fortunes). The establishment of the Hewlett and Packard foundations 
represented the first wave of high-tech philanthropy, from fortunes made in the earliest years 
of Silicon Valley. (A second wave, led by Microsoft’s Bill Gates and Intel’s Gordon Moore would 
come in the late 1990s, followed by a third, exemplified by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, at 
the end of the next decade). 
Waldemar Nielsen has pointed out how starkly William Hewlett, a representative of ‘‘the new 
kind of entrepreneur who has come to the fore in the era of high technology,’’ stood out from 
most of the major donors whose fortunes fed the major foundations of the time. They were 
essentially Victorian figures who had come of age in a United States that was predominantly 
rural and small town and their morals and mores matched their upbringings; they were men of 
limited education and conservative social outlook. In contrast, Hewlett, Nielsen explained, was 
‘‘highly educated [and] sophisticated in social outlook,’’ with a degree in electrical engineering 
from Stanford and a fortune that derived directly from his technological expertise. He was, in a 
sense, a forerunner to the ‘‘knowledge workers’’ who now dominate the upper reaches of the 
economy, those highly credentialed men and women who have benefited from what journalist 
Chrystia Freeland has termed the ‘‘nerd premium,’’ the oversized gains that accrue to those 
who can manipulate big data or have been initiated into the mysteries of code.19 
These possibilities have reshaped the ranks of the philanthropic class, stamping it with a 
decidedly entrepreneurial ethos. Today, less great wealth is the product of inheritance than 
ever before in the last half century, matching levels associated with the first Gilded Age at the 
turn of the last century, when, according to one tally, 84 percent of the country’s millionaires 
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had earned their own fortunes. Indeed, according to a report from UBS and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘‘In 2000, the number of self-made billionaires overtook the number 
of multi-generational billionaires for the first time since the first ‘Gilded Age’.’’ Of the more than 
1,300 worldwide billionaires the study tallied, it identified 66 percent as self-made, compared 
to just 43 percent two decades before.  
It is not surprising, then, that this generation has witnessed a surge in large-scale giving. 
Historically, self-made wealth has found its way into philanthropic channels. Examining a list 
of 4,047 millionaires compiled by the New York Tribune in 1892, a team of scholars found that 
‘‘the only variable which seems to have had a profound influence on the propensity of a 
millionaire to be a philanthropist was the method by which he acquired his wealth. The ‘self-
made men’ in the sample were much more philanthropic than were those who inherited their 
wealth.’’20 
What is new today is not the predominance of self-made wealth but the speed at which that 
self-making occurs - and thus, the age at which those who have accumulated great wealth can 
apply it to philanthropic ends. The vast majority of the major donors of the 20th century only 
turned to systematic philanthropy (as opposed to haphazard gift-giving to intimates) late in 
their careers, most often as a post-retirement project. They created foundations and devoted 
themselves to their operation (if they chose to do so) only after they had finished their business 
career. This is no longer so often the case. As the World Wealth Report 2010 from Merrill 
Lynch-Capgemini notes, more of the world’s rich were opting for ‘giving while living’ strategies; 
philanthropists are increasingly incorporating their giving strategies into their ongoing wealth 
accumulation and capital-preservation plans. This has also introduced a new character type 
into the field - the youthful self-made philanthropist, exemplified by Mark Zuckerberg, who in 
2013, along with his wife Priscilla Chan, became the first individual under 30 to head up the 
Chronicle of Philanthropy’s annual list of the top 50 givers. After the couple pledged to give 99 
percent of their Facebook shares to charitable causes, former New York mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, announced that the pledge signaled that ‘‘30 is the new 70’’ for philanthropists. 
‘‘The traditional approach to giving - leaving it to old age or death - is falling by the wayside, as 
it should.’’  
It’s important to note that Zuckerberg and Chan are still very much the exception. A 2015 
Wealth-X and Arton Capital report stated that only 1.1 percent of all ultra-high net worth 
philanthropists are under 40 years old, while 12.6 percent were over 80; it calculated the 
average age of the ultra-high net worth philanthropist to be 65. But young mega-donors have 
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gained a disproportionate amount of media attention in recent years, in part because their 
ranks contains some of the sector’s biggest givers, and have exerted an outsized influence on 
the public discourse surrounding philanthropy, pushing for a ‘‘giving while living’’ approach.21 
It is difficult to isolate the novel characteristics of philanthropic youth from those of the sector 
in which youthful fortunes were made. But one indisputably new development is that 
philanthropists are now approaching the vocation with many decades of work ahead of them. 
Will this encourage more risk-taking or more deliberateness? Will this dampen the attraction 
of perpetuity? Will the strategies and priorities of young philanthropists change as they grow 
older - much as voting patterns tend to? Will the spread of ‘‘Giving While Living’’ produce 
philanthropic results that look any different from traditional practice, in which large-scale giving 
was usually conducted in the final years of a donor’s life, or after his or her death? We simply 
do not have enough information to answer these questions; they will be crucial to explore in 
the years ahead. 
 
5. Philanthropy and the Rise of the State  
Just as philanthropy has been transformed in the last half century by changes in wealth 
distribution derived from large-scale shifts in political economy, it has been transformed as well 
by changes in its relationship to the state.  
There have been four major shifts in this regard over the last 100 years. In the first decades of 
the 20th century, only a small handful of the early philanthropists established institutions with 
policy-shaping goals - the scholar Judith Sealander, in her work on the subject, identifies only 
six of them: Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller Sr., John D. Rockefeller Jr., Edward 
Harkness, Olivia Sage, and Julius Rosenwald. Though few in number, they commanded the 
vast majority of the philanthropic resources in the field and were able to achieve some 
significant achievements building and shaping public institutions. The next shift occurred with 
FDR’s expansion of the federal government’s responsibilities for social welfare as a response 
to the Great Depression. The growth accelerated during the 1950s and 1960s; by the time of 
the establishment of the Hewlett Foundation, the federal government had already usurped 
philanthropy’s position as the major funder of a vast array of fields in which philanthropy had 
once been the dominant presence. In the arenas of scientific research, higher education, health 
and medicine, elementary and secondary education, and social welfare, the sector was coming 
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to terms with its diminished status relative to government. Foundations no longer could claim 
to be engaged in state building for the state had been built already.22 
The establishment of the World Health Organization in 1948, the National Science Foundation 
in 1950, and the National Institute of Health in 1951 all signaled the transferal of primary 
responsibility for the funding of research and infrastructure development in key fields from the 
largest legacy foundations to the federal government. At times, the shift precipitated a 
philanthropic retreat from those fields; shortly after the creation of the WHO, for instance, the 
Rockefeller Foundation shut down its own international health division. There had been a long 
history of such exchanges; as one writer noted in 1938, discussing education philanthropy, 
‘‘When the State steps in, the foundations steps out.’’ But no longer could the State assume, 
or foundations relinquish, responsibilities as anything like equal partners.  
In fact, nonprofit institutions and organizations more generally became increasingly reliant on 
the federal government and considerably less reliant on foundations or on private donors, 
especially as the federal government began to contract out services to nonprofits as grantees. 
By 1973, in this ‘‘third-party government’’ arrangement, foundations grants ‘‘amounted to less 
than 1 percent of all U.S. expenditures on health, education, or social welfare.’’ Soon 
government provided more revenue to nonprofits (excluding religious congregations) than all 
forms of private giving from individuals, corporations, and foundations combined. Nonprofit 
leaders grew concerned that this public funding would threaten the fundamental essence of 
voluntarism. As one foundation leader worried in 1966, federal oversight had already 
transformed many nonprofits into ‘‘little more than appendages of government.’’23 
These changes required foundation leaders to hone a sharper sense of sector-wide identity; 
they also required them to recalibrate their own sense of status relative to government and to 
take account of the limits to philanthropy’s resources. This did not necessarily translate into a 
reduction of ambition - it often meant instead that goals became more clearly defined and 
circumscribed. ‘‘The ideology of philanthropic foundations had always placed a high quotient 
on the values of innovation and impact,’’ writes Steven Wheatley, but in the context of limited 
philanthropic resources, ‘‘these qualities were now elevated to be weapons of institutional self-
defense.24 
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The appreciation of philanthropic limits also underscored the strategic importance of leverage. 
Of course, this was by no means a new concept for the philanthropic sector. From the origins 
of the modern foundation at the turn of the last century, its leaders have sought to utilize 
philanthropic resources to prime public spending. The insistence of the Peabody Education 
Fund, the General Education Board, and the Julius Rosenwald Fund on matching grants, for 
instance, stemmed from a desire to transfer responsibility for funding public systems of health 
and education to tax-payers. But the emphasis of these early funders was less on the greater 
resources that would ultimately be available to government (though they certainly intuited this), 
than on the dangers of ‘‘pauperizing’’ citizens by leaving them dependent on private 
benefactors. By the mid-1960s, the focus had shifted to the massive differentials in resources. 
‘‘[W]hen the National Science Foundation moves into a field,’’ John Gardner, the president of 
the Carnegie Corporation, announced to his trustees in 1958, ‘‘it puts up funds on a scale 
which dwarfs anything the Corporation can do.’’ In light of this, the Carnegie Corporation 
needed to ‘‘take infinite pains in husbanding our modest income and devoting it to precisely 
those projects which will have the most leverage in moving one or another field ahead.’’ This 
anxious combination of modesty and ambition is characteristic of much of the discourse from 
foundation leaders of the period.25 
For a select group of foundations, the increased dynamism and resources at the disposal of 
the state prompted a re-engagement with public policy - what might be termed Great Society 
philanthropy. The earliest foundations, and especially the Rockefeller Foundation, had dabbled 
in policy change in the past. But this intervention had provoked intense congressional 
opposition, culminating in the Walsh Commission of 1913-1915, and had resulted in most 
foundations retreating from policy work to the safer confines of funding disinterested scholarly 
research and expertise. However, by mid-century, the mounting sense of crisis surrounding 
race and poverty pushed several foundations to take more aggressive approaches toward the 
pursuit of social change and public policy seemed an especially promising avenue. This was 
in part because during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a tight network linked the 
worlds of foundations, academia, and government, with personnel shuttling back and forth 
among the realms. John Gardner, for instance, moved from the presidency of the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to become 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; McGeorge Bundy traveled in the other direction, 
serving as National Security Advisor for Kennedy and Johnson and then as the president of 
the Ford Foundation.26 
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Then, philanthropy’s impact on policy relied more on the common bonds that had been forged 
in faculty rooms and social clubs than on an official apparatus of public-private partnership as 
has been constructed today. (In April 1965, at the Ford Foundation’s initiative, Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey did chair a meeting at the White House with representatives from the 
philanthropic sector to consider the possibility of a more formalized collaboration. An 
agreement to establish a liaison between the top management at the Bureau of the Budget 
and the Ford Foundation emerged from the conversation, but the plan was never officially 
acted upon). But these affinities were strong and, combined with a common faith in the capacity 
of large-scale government interventions to achieve social good, produced some important 
achievements. The Field Foundation of New York, for instance, advised the Kennedy 
administration and helped shape the amendments to the 1962 Social Security Act. The Ford 
Foundation’s Gray Areas program, a massive urban renewal effort, provided a key model for 
the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty.27 
Ford, along with a corps of other progressive funders, also threw its support behind the civil 
rights movement. There is a small mountain of academic literature suggesting the ways in 
which philanthropy has tended to co-opt and moderate grassroots social justice organizations. 
That it often sought to do so in the context of the freedom struggle is undeniable; one Ford 
Foundation internal memo from 1969, for instance, argued for supporting the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) in an effort to make it ‘‘operate within the system,’’ in an effort to stop 
the organization from becoming more radical, like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC). But it is also undeniable that, compared to the quiescence of preceding 
decades, foundations such as Ford (led by its indomitable president, McGeorge Bundy, who 
arrived in 1967), the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and smaller funders such as, Taconic and 
Stern, took a more public and aggressive stand in support of the rights of African-Americans 
than foundations had ever before (the Rosenwald Fund being the lone historical exception). 
Most controversially, Ford supported a voter registration drive in Cleveland, led by CORE, 
which helped elect the city’s first African-American mayor. Ford also began to invest in 
advocacy organizations, activist networks, and civil rights litigation supporting the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, and providing early, essential funding for the Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Native American Rights Fund, the Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Women’s Law Fund. In the assessment of 
Waldemar Nielsen, generally grudging with his praise, ‘‘Never in the history of American 
philanthropy had anything comparable in scale and aggressiveness to the Ford Foundation’s 
assault on the problems of race and poverty been seen.’’28 Ford’s activism in the 1960s is 
                                                          
27 Nielsen, Big Foundations, 387; Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 215. 
28 Karen Ferguson, Top Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power, and the Invention of Racial Liberalism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 221; Nielsen, Golden 
Donors, 64.   
22 
 
frequently invoked as a precedent for contemporary philanthropic engagement with public 
policy. But we must be careful about how we incorporate Ford into the story of philanthropy’s 
development over the last half century. First, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to 
which other foundations and private funders operating during the mid-1960s shared the 
commitment to ‘‘activist’’ philanthropy. Doing so minimizes the significance of the turn toward 
policy embraced by a much larger swath of the sector in recent decades. Ford’s activism, and 
that of a group of smaller progressive foundations to which it was allied, stood out largely in 
contrast to the approaches of the other large foundations of the period, which gravitated toward 
traditional ameliorative remedies to social ills. Waldemar Nielsen estimated that only 10 
percent of Ford’s outlays could be considered experimental or activist in any respect; the figure 
for most other large foundations he put at closer to 1 percent. Mary Anna Colwell, a political 
scientist who reviewed the ‘‘public policy grants’’ of the largest foundations between 1972 and 
1975 has documented that Ford accounted for more than half of them. 
Indeed, when the Peterson Commission inquired of foundations whether they had made any 
controversial grants in the years between 1966 and 1968 - and this would include nearly all 
grants meant to influence public policy - only 1 percent of the foundations that responded did 
so in the affirmative, and the grants they specified made up only 0.1 percent of their total 
outlays. At the time of the Hewlett Foundation’s founding, most foundations simply had little 
inclination to challenge the status quo.29 
Second, the activist model that Ford presented actually sparked two divergent reactions that 
pushed the sector in opposite directions in its engagement with policy over the subsequent 
decades. One was a political backlash. The voter registration drive funded by Ford caused 
politicians to worry that they were all vulnerable to foundations’ political and electoral whims. 
Revelations that Ford had directed grants to Robert Kennedy’s aides that allowed them to 
travel abroad after the presidential candidate’s assassination signaled to many members of 
congress that the bonds between partisan politics and philanthropy had become too intimate. 
Members of congress who opposed the civil rights movement worried that a progressive, 
unaccountable minority had subverted the will of the people. Wright Patman, a fiery populist 
Texas representative who would initiate a congressional investigation of foundations in the 
mid-1960s, wondered whether Ford and its allies had ‘‘a grandiose design to bring vast 
political, economic, and social changes to the nation.’’ Whereas today, a foundation executive 
might have taken that question as a cue to fire up a discussion of catalytic giving, in 1969 the 
query for Patman was meant to be a chastisement.30 
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Indeed, Patman believed that ‘‘philanthropy - one of mankind’s more noble instincts - ha[d] 
been perverted into a vehicle for institutionalized, deliberate evasion of fiscal and moral 
responsibility to the nation.’’ To address these fears, which included substantial evidence of 
tax avoidance and financial malfeasance (especially at smaller foundations), Congress 
initiated an investigation of foundations that, unlike the investigations of the 1950s, led to 
significant regulatory action. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposed an annual payout 
requirement on foundations, tightened restrictions on their political activity, required 
foundations to pay an excise tax to support Treasury oversight, increased reporting 
requirements, and prohibited self-dealing, among other reforms. The deliberations over the act 
- and their exposure of the intensity of the critics of philanthropy, who could no longer be safely 
dismissed as populist cranks or racist reactionaries, as in past investigations - traumatized 
foundation leaders. The experience encouraged a retreat from politics and policy, and from the 
support of grassroots social movement organizations in particular, that lasted decades.31 
If the example of Ford’s philanthropic activism, or at least the hostile reactions it engendered, 
led many foundations to disengage from the political realm, among a certain set of funders it 
had the opposite effect. They adopted Ford’s model and made good on Patman’s fears of 
philanthropic wealth ‘‘bring[ing] vast political, economic, and social changes to the nation.’’ 
These were not, however, Ford’s progressive allies but a conservative vanguard that sought 
to use philanthropy to create a counter-establishment that would challenge the liberal elite 
presiding over the academy, philanthropy, and the media. The emergence of conservative 
movement philanthropy in the 1970s complicates a narrative of post-1969 political quiescence. 
How one tells this story, and where one discovers novelty matters, especially in the context of 
the current moment. In debates over the recent politicization of philanthropy, each partisan 
camp advances different versions of the ‘‘But they started it first!’’ argument. Progressives 
accuse conservatives of ‘‘weaponizing’’ philanthropy while conservatives answer that they 
merely began arming themselves in a war that had long been waging. Appreciating the tangled 
historical roots of the contemporary scene forces us to consider the legitimacy of the funding 
apparatus and practices of our ideological antagonists in the same light as those of our allies. 
The conservative philanthropic counter-offensive did not seek to restore some prelapsarian 
condition of foundation political neutrality. It suspected the pose of non-partisanship as a front 
for subtle and pernicious progressive allegiance. Instead, it threw aside all pretense of 
disinterested academic expertise. If the free market was in fact under attack by the forces of 
the liberal establishment - led by academic, media, and political elites - as conservatives 
believed, it was the responsibility of conservatives to man the barricades in the defense of 
capitalism. In other words, they planned to beat Ford at its own game. 
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To do so, they took both a traditional and an innovative approach. On one hand, conservatives 
focused on human capital development and on academic programs, much like the older legacy 
foundations had done earlier in the century. The main strategic outlet for conservative funding 
was the think tank. Yet their vision of how this institution would operate was quite different from 
the existing model, exemplified by the venerable Brookings Institution, dedicated to the pursuit 
of disinterested academic research and founded with early grants from the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Institutions like the newly empowered American Enterprise Institute (which had 
been founded in 1938 but had retreated from explicit partisanship after an investigation by the 
IRS for its support of Goldwater in 1964) and the newly established Heritage Foundation 
(funded by small donors and by the beer magnate Joseph Coors) would develop explicitly 
conservative policies and work closely with advocacy groups to ensure those policies’ 
enactment. On these terms, conservative philanthropy achieved a startling victory with the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan. After his election, the Heritage Foundation composed a 1,000-
page manual for conservative governance, Mandate for Leadership; at Reagan’s first cabinet 
meeting, the president handed it out and called it ‘‘a blueprint to run the administration.’’ In fact, 
Heritage officials would boast a few months after Reagan assumed the presidency that over 
60 percent of the Mandate’s 1,270 policy recommendations had been implemented or were in 
the process of being so. As Waldemar Nielsen commented, ‘‘Even in the heyday of the access 
of the Brookings Institution to the policy councils of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, nothing 
of equivalent presumptuousness had ever been seen.’’ Over the next decade, conservative 
think tanks continued to draw in funds; during the 1990s, the top 20 think tanks on the Right 
received well over $1 billion.32 
 
6. Philanthropy in the Age of Entrepreneurship and Budgetary Austerity  
This period of conservative ascendency inaugurated the second shift in the relationship 
between philanthropy and the state. It involved both a boost and a challenge to philanthropy. 
On the one hand, the free market ideology that brought Reagan to office reflected declining 
levels of trust in government, which had been falling steadily since a high point in the mid-
1960s. In the space left by the diminished faith in public, tax-supported systems of governance, 
the allure of the entrepreneur and of market-based approaches germinated. At the same time, 
Reagan’s tax and regulatory policies helped fuel the massive increases in income inequality 
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of the subsequent decades and to create the expanded fortunes and belief in the primacy of 
private action that would lay the foundations for mega-philanthropy’s rise.  
If government was the problem for Reagan and his conservative allies, voluntarism was the 
solution. As one of his advisers phrased it, nonprofit organizations could ‘‘pick up the slack’’ 
for the cuts in government programs that Reagan pushed. Yet Reagan also slashed funding 
to nonprofit organizations (especially to those with progressive affiliations, in an effort to 
‘‘defund the Left’’). In the early 1980s, the real value of government support to nonprofits 
declined by a quarter and did not recover for more than a decade. The administration and the 
Republican-led Congress also sought to clamp down on nonprofit advocacy and lobbying. 
Faced with these pressures, many foundations took up a defensive posture; instead of pushing 
policy change, they turned to help nonprofits deal with the loss of funding caused by budgetary 
retrenchment. In fact, during Reagan’s first term, social welfare spending became the top-
ranked category of foundation giving, surpassing health and education. Foundations became 
briefly that which they had historically defined themselves against - traditional, ameliorative 
institutions.33 
Over time, the sector halted this retreat from policy and advocacy. This shift brought about the 
third period in the relationship between philanthropy and the state, one that mixes elements of 
the first two in a novel configuration. It combines an acceptance of the limits of philanthropic 
resources relative to those of the state with an acknowledgement of, or an insistence upon, 
limited governmental capacities relative to those of entrepreneurs. It fuses a Gilded Age 
confidence in the prerogatives of private donors to an understanding of the balance sheets of 
21st century governance. The valuation of leverage seems much less deferential to the status 
of public institutions than it did a half century ago. If philanthropy can no longer engage in state 
building (at least not in the context of the United States), it has thrown itself more recently into 
the project of state-shaping.  
The start of this shift coincided with and was fed by the trend toward mega-philanthropy and 
the veneration of the entrepreneur. Characterized by new techniques and instruments of 
collaboration and contact between government and private philanthropy, this third period 
featured many new funders who were attracted to policy change. It also brought forward older, 
more established foundations that saw the need to increase their commitments to advocacy. 
In 2004, for instance, the Pew Charitable Trusts transformed from a private foundation into a 
private charity so that, under the regulations governing nonprofits, it could devote more of its 
resources to policy advocacy. In this case, we again encounter the question of scale’s relation 
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to novelty: we must consider how the greater number of policy-engaged funders, with greater 
resources at their disposal, shifts philanthropic practice into uncharted territory.  
This intensification and broadening of the pursuit of policy change happened gradually, as 
funders and foundations overcame entrenched resistance to political engagement. It’s difficult 
to recall, for instance, given how aggressive the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s advocacy 
campaigns have become, that in the first decade after its establishment in 2000 it was 
considerably less comfortable with such work. In her recent book, political scientist Megan 
Tompkins-Stange notes that the foundation initially held a ‘‘very strong bias’’ against policy 
advocacy. It even named its Washington, D.C., outpost its ‘‘East Coast’’ office to avoid an 
undue association with attempts to influence federal policy. And yet within the last decade, that 
discomfort with policy has dissipated and transformed into something more like zeal, not just 
at the Gates Foundation, but for many other large foundations and individual donors. According 
to a recent survey by Kristen Goss of donors who had signed the Giving Pledge, or who had 
recently appeared on the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s or the Foundation Center’s annual lists 
of top givers, more than half ‘‘have serious policy interests: they are seeking to inform, 
advocate for or against, or reform the implementation of public policy through charitable, 
advocacy, and/or issue-specific electoral donations.’’34 
It is difficult to isolate the precise reasons for this shift. To some extent, they vary depending 
on the particularities of different fields and program areas. In health philanthropy, for instance, 
foundations had largely avoided engaging systematic reform or challenging the medical 
establishment after a failed effort in the 1930s led by the Milbank Memorial Fund. But the 
convergence of the Clinton administration’s campaign to tackle health care reform with the 
emergence of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) as one of the nation’s largest 
foundations (that happened to have a focus on health) led to a decades-long campaign led by 
RWJF and a number of other funders (including some even more aggressive with regard to 
advocacy, such as Atlantic Philanthropies), to push for comprehensive health care reform. 
Their efforts culminated in the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.35 
As American philanthropy has increasingly been directed overseas - between 1995 and 2005, 
foundation giving to international projects increased by 80 percent - and as an understanding 
of the transnational nature of the most significant issues facing the world became more 
prominent, donors have also come to appreciate that global health offers even greater 
opportunities for influencing policy than in the domestic sphere. This has come about both 
because of advances within biomedical science and because of the perceived centrality of 
health to socio-economic development. Donors are therefore aware that small upticks in 
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budget lines directed toward global health policy can have dramatic impacts. They believe that 
they can have a hand in nation building in the developing world, especially in the construction 
and management of the global public health infrastructure. 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, for instance, has spent more than $15 billion on global 
health programs to date, and is in fact responsible for much of the growth in global health 
philanthropy in recent decades. This prominence has elevated the Gates Foundation to quasi-
state status in its collaboration with transnational health policy organizations such as the World 
Health Organization - for instance, Gates sits on the board of GAVI, the vaccine alliance to 
which it has given more than $4 billion, along with the WHO, the World Bank, and UNICEF. 
Gates appears to have understood the configuration of the increasing resources that are now 
being spent by the governments of the Western world on global health, and it has shrewdly 
leveraged its own wealth and Gates’ reputational capital to increase and channel governmental 
funding to its preferred ends. The result has been that Gates, as the largest single non-state 
donor, has been able to influence global health and development policy to support its own 
institutional goals.36 
There were a host of other factors that pushed the philanthropic sector as a whole to engage 
more readily with policy. The sector-wide preoccupation with demonstrating impact and 
leveraging limited resources, to be discussed further below, pointed in this direction. And as 
1969 receded into the past, the chilling effect it had on funders diminished. At the same time, 
the activism of the 1960s, much of it nourished by philanthropy, had created new 
constituencies, funding areas, and nonprofit networks in which to invest. As organizations 
devoted to consumer protection, environmental conservation and justice, women’s rights, 
patients’ rights, and the rights of gays, people of color, and other minorities matured, they 
became more sophisticated about how to engage local, state, and federal government and 
provided funders with more options to push for policy change. 
The emergence of more sophisticated institutions and organizations on both the political right 
and left, and the growth of both conservative and libertarian philanthropy and social justice 
philanthropy signaled an enhanced ideological and political differentiation within the nonprofit 
sector. This diversity fueled a sort of arms race, in which activists and funders on the Right and 
on the Left appropriate each other’s innovations and push ahead to make new ones. 
It started in the late 1960s, when conservatives modeled their philanthropic counter-
mobilization on Ford’s activism. As Jane Mayer has recently written, conservatives took Ford’s 
support for public-interest litigation as a lesson in ‘‘how philanthropy could achieve large-scale 
change through the courts while bypassing the democratic electoral process.’’ Progressives 
soon registered the success of conservative philanthropists and took their work as a model for 
the philanthropic reinvigoration of the Left. Progressively aligned foundations invested in 
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research into the strategies of conservative donors, which underscored the importance of 
providing general operating support and funding with a long-term vision of social change in 
mind. By the new millennium, progressives also began to develop their own advocacy-oriented 
think tanks, such as the Center for American Progress (CAP), with support from donors on the 
left. These think tanks pushed their own innovations, which were then adopted by those on the 
Right. CAP, for instance, created a separate ‘‘social welfare’’ 501(c)(4) arm to handle most of 
its lobbying and soon after, nearly all of the major conservative and libertarian think tanks had 
sprouted ‘‘social welfare’’ appendages as well. The Left also intuited early the importance of 
discretion and secrecy to progressive donors who wished to support policy advocacy. In 1976, 
a donor-advised fund, Tides Foundation, was established that could channel philanthropic 
resources to progressive causes while maintaining donor anonymity. Conservatives took note 
and in 1999 created DonorsTrust, which provides similar services for conservative 
philanthropists.37 
The military metaphors often invoked to describe the philanthropic interventions into the policy 
realm of the last few decades, however, must contend with the increasing diversification of the 
field of funders. In one respect, the scene does now resemble a Napoleonic battlefield, with 
the Koch network of conservative and libertarian donors and the Democracy Alliance of 
progressive donors arrayed on opposite sides. But in other respects, the situation is now much 
more like a messy insurgency, with donors across the ideological spectrum, including a corps 
of technocrats who do not fit neatly into the Left-Right dichotomy and are willing to make 
alliances with either camp, all utilizing policy in combat against the status quo. (Philanthropic 
investment in criminal justice reform provides an especially good example of this.) 
Philanthropy’s engagement with policy also tracks, and has gained momentum from, the 
flooding of money into the political realm more generally in recent decades. The undermining 
of post-Watergate campaign finance reforms through various loopholes, culminating in the 
Citizens United Supreme Court decision of 2010, helped orchestrate a convergence between 
the realms of philanthropic and political giving, as with the channeling of ‘‘dark money’’ to 
501(c)(4) ‘‘social welfare’’ organizations. At the same time, the nation’s leading industries have 
become increasingly sophisticated about the strategic import of governmental engagement. 
Corporate lobbying has increased steadily, to some $2.6 billion in 2015. In the process, 
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corporate leaders who also doubled as philanthropists became more comfortable with the 
mechanisms available to shape the political process.38 
There is considerable evidence that suggests that the money sluicing around the political 
system has pushed politicians further to the ideological poles (and especially to the Right). And 
in fact, another reason for the shift toward engagement with policy is the dramatic increase in 
levels of partisanship over the last several decades. As Steven Teles, Heather Hurlburt, and 
Mark Schmitt pointed out in a 2014 article in the Stanford Social Innovation Review, this trend 
has undermined the model of policymaking that had been developed by the ‘‘learned 
foundations’’ in the first half of the 20th century and which informed much grantmaking in the 
century’s final decades as well, in which foundations helped supply ‘‘bipartisan solutions to 
expert-assessed problems.’’ This model granted foundations a prime position as purveyors 
and supporters of disinterested inquiry and analysis. It validated philanthropy’s disengagement 
from politics - even granting it a normative cast. 
As we have seen, this model began to erode in the 1960s, both with the Ford Foundation’s 
investments in advocacy groups and with the development of conservative movement 
philanthropy, which attacked the very notion of philanthropy working on behalf of a nonpartisan 
‘‘public interest.’’ These developments have forced more foundations and philanthropists to 
enter the partisan fray and to take clear sides in battles over policy. Or perhaps they have 
simply exposed philanthropy’s partisan inclinations that were hiding behind claims to 
disinterestedness. In recent years, more funders have moved beyond supporting think tanks 
and academic institutions to more direct means of shaping policy, through advocacy. Teles, 
Hurlburt, and Schmitt, for example, cite the Atlantic Philanthropies’ support for grassroots 
efforts on behalf of health care reform, which helped bring about passage of the Affordable 
Care Act.39 
 
7. Philanthropy and Education Reform: A Case Study 
Philanthropy’s engagement with K-12 education provides a useful case study for tracking these 
shifts. In fact, no sector has experienced them more dramatically in recent years; over the last 
three decades, foundation funding of education has nearly quadrupled. Of course, elementary 
and high school education has always been a central area of focus for American philanthropy. 
Elementary education was the first investment objective of the newly established philanthropic 
foundations at the turn of the last century. From the 1890s with the Peabody, Slater, and 
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Jeanes funds and in the subsequent decades with foundations funded by John D. Rockefeller, 
Andrew Carnegie, and Julius Rosenwald, philanthropy focused on improving the Negro 
schools in the American South, and sought to increase public funding of education more 
generally in the region.40 
By the 1940s and 1950s, however, these legacy foundations had lost much of their interest in 
the improvement of K-12 education. Elementary and secondary public education was then 
almost exclusively a matter for states and localities to fund and manage, so there was little 
national K-12 education policy to shape. The Ford Foundation’s urban reform program in the 
1960s did include a school reform component: an attempt to support community-based 
schools, most controversially in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district in New York. Ford’s 
association with the movement alienated teacher unions and attracted the scorn of 
congressional critics. In the wake of the deliberations over the Tax Reform Act of 1969, large 
foundations backed away from these sorts of major, aggressive investments in K-12 education. 
By the late 1980s, however, due to the impact of the 1983 Department of Education report ‘‘A 
Nation At Risk,’’ the federal government began efforts to address the perceived crisis in 
elementary and secondary education across the United States. This led to the emergence of 
a bipartisan political effort at the national level, led by the administration of George H.W. Bush 
and with the collaboration of the National Governors Association, headed by then-Governor 
Bill Clinton, aimed at reforming K-12 education. This development in turn revived the interest 
of the large foundations in influencing national education policy. They first jumped on the 
bandwagon of ‘‘systemic reform,’’ which sought, as the term suggests, to reform the entire K-
12 system. The approach was supported by the Clinton administration and many legacy 
foundations, including Rockefeller, Carnegie, Pew, Atlantic, Wallace, and MacArthur, set aside 
programmatic funding for K-12. The program officers appointed to supervise these investments 
worked closely with the academic leaders of the reform movement.  
Most ambitiously, in 1993, Walter Annenberg announced a $500 million gift for public 
education, the largest ever of its kind, which was directed to 18 locally designed sites across 
35 states; matching grants brought in another $600 million from other foundations, universities, 
and businesses. But by most accounts, the Annenberg Challenge, spread too thin, failed to 
achieve systemic change and the reform movement more generally ran out of gas by the end 
of the decade. Most of the foundations that had backed reform efforts abandoned their K-12 
programs, with their leading program officers leaving the sector and taking refuge within 
academic institutions. It was around this point, as the older reform movement waned, that K-
12 philanthropy experienced what one scholar has called a ‘‘changing of the guard.’’ The 2001 
No Child Left Behind Act, which further increased the federal government’s role in education, 
afforded these funders an exceptional opportunity to participate in national policymaking.  
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Prior to 1990, the most active foundations in education were located predominantly on the East 
Coast and had their origins in the first half of the 20th century. But by the turn of the new 
century, a new corps of funders focusing on K-12 had emerged, spread throughout the nation. 
At their forefront were mega-foundations with living donors such as the Gates, Broad, Walton, 
and Dell foundations, along with Bloomberg Philanthropies, which have all thrown their weight 
behind different elements of the new education reform movement. Education reform favors 
school choice (and especially charter schools), high-stakes testing, merit-pay for teachers, and 
other market-based approaches. According to calculations by political scientist Jeffrey Snyder, 
by 2005, the largest of these new funders outspent the older foundations on K-12 education - 
giving by the Walton Family Foundation had doubled in those years, education grantmaking 
by the Gates Foundation had tripled, while Broad, Dell, and Robertson increased their 
grantmaking by more than a factor of ten. At the same time, grantmaking from Carnegie, Ford, 
Wallace, Kellogg, and Annenberg declined by nearly a third. By 2010, grants from the Gates 
and Walton foundations accounted for more than a quarter of total K-12 philanthropy in the 
sector. These funders combine their philanthropic donations with their political and lobbying 
giving, often channeled through nonprofits, to create a powerful force for policy change.41 
Indeed, the education-focused mega-foundations became increasingly adept at the arts of 
political advocacy, targeting the federal, state, and even the local levels, in efforts to sway 
referenda or influence school board elections. According to research by Sarah Reckhow and 
Jeffrey Snyder, nearly twice as many inflation-adjusted dollars went to groups conducting 
national-level advocacy or policy research on education in 2010 as in 2000. ‘‘Moreover,’’ these 
scholars note, ‘‘national advocacy funding grew more than 23% faster than total giving over 
the decade, suggesting the increased emphasis on this giving did not merely stem from more 
granting overall.’’ The growth was especially significant in the later years of that decade. 
According to Megan Tompkins-Stange and Sarah Reckhow, between 2005 and 2010, the 
Gates and Broad foundations more than doubled their giving to national advocacy groups. In 
2012, the Broad Foundation initiated a major strategic reorientation which resulted in a decision 
to channel as much as half of the foundation’s resources toward advancing policy-related 
efforts at the federal and state levels. Perhaps the most significant achievement of these 
advocacy campaigns was the institution of Common Core, a nationally agreed upon set of 
academic standards that was heavily funded and promoted by many of the large foundations 
associated with the education reform movement. Common Core is perceived by its supporters 
to be the fundamental basis of the federalization of K-12 education policy, since if implemented 
it will ensure that all schools are committed to the same outcome standards. Yet it is worth 
noting that these sorts of short-term political accomplishments can be Pyrrhic victories, since 
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they tend to galvanize their own opposition; and in fact, the pushback to Common Core, from 
both the Left and Right, has been intense.42 
Just as effective as philanthropy’s support for political advocacy was their seeding of key 
administrative positions at the national, state, and local levels. President Obama’s Secretary 
of Education, Arne Duncan, took many of his key deputies from the Gates Foundation or the 
foundation’s grantees. The Broad Foundation funds leadership academies to place school 
managers and superintendents favorable to reform in key districts across the nation. The 
foundation claimed, for instance, that in 2009, 43 percent of all large urban superintendent 
openings were filled by Broad Academy graduates. These pipelines, personnel networks, and 
aligned ideologies allowed for close partnerships between the education reform funders and 
governmental agencies. In 2009, for instance, the Department of Education unveiled Race to 
the Top, a program in which states competed for stimulus funds by meeting a set of education 
reform criteria; Gates assisted many of the states in preparing proposals for the funds. The 
influence of the big foundations on a policy issues had perhaps never before been so publicly 
displayed in Washington.43 
The last decade has revealed some key differences between this ‘‘new guard’’ of K-12 funders 
and the older foundations, although there is also evidence that the ‘‘old guard’’ is adopting 
some of the practices of the new. First, the new mega-foundations gave in considerably larger 
amounts. Second, these new education funders took a more ‘‘top-down’’ approach than their 
predecessors, designing initiatives and programs and then finding grantees to implement them 
(the Annenberg Challenge, which took a more ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach with its grantees, leaving 
each to determine strategy, served as a powerful cautionary tale for these funders). Third, they 
sought to mount a jurisdictional challenge to the public school system, funding organizations 
that provided an alternate model for running schools (most prominently charter schools), as 
well as organizations that provide alternative sources of human capital outside the traditional 
educational establishment. Education scholars Sarah Reckhow and Jeffrey Snyder have 
determined that among the top 15 education foundations, ‘‘Funding for traditional public 
schools dropped from 16% of grant dollars in 2000 to 8% in 2010, while funding for charter 
schools rose from around 3% in 2000 to 16% in 2010.’’ The effort is geared not toward 
reforming the education from within, but toward disrupting it from without. Finally, recent 
funding is more concentrated, flowing to a denser network of common grantees, with the top 
grantees receiving an even greater share of total grant dollars. Sarah Reckhow and Jeffrey 
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Snyder estimate that the top five grantees of the 15 largest education foundations in 2010 
received over $150 million, 18 percent of the grant dollars distributed by the group.44 
The shifts within education reform philanthropy highlight several of the developments in 
funders’ engagement with policy in recent years that can make strong claims to novelty and 
that extend into many other policy areas as well. For one, public-private partnerships and 
funding collaboratives have become more formalized, complex, and institutionalized, when 
compared to the informal relational networks of a half century ago between policy actors and 
funders. The initiative to partner comes just as often now from within governmental agencies, 
which are seeking supplemental resources in light of reduced discretionary budgets, as from 
without. In other words, if philanthropists are becoming more sophisticated about utilizing the 
levers of change available to them to influence government, government is becoming more 
sophisticated about leveraging philanthropy as well. In 2003, with support from the Michigan 
Council of Foundations, the state established the Governor’s Office of Foundation Liaison, 
which ‘‘helps educate state officials about foundations, matches grantmakers with government 
officials and supports the development of partnerships between them, and attracts national 
grant dollars to the state.’’ A 2010 study identified 18 examples in which local or state 
governments employed a designated office or liaison in order to foster public-private 
partnerships; there are also several within federal departments, including HUD and the 
Department of Education. The creation of the Social Innovation Fund (SIF) in 2009 represented 
a new type of public-private partnership initiated in the interest of scale, one that placed 
foundations in the unfamiliar role of intermediate grantees. Housed within the Corporation for 
National and Community Service, the SIF had an initial budget of $50 million, which it granted 
to a number of foundations, which then re-granted the funds to nonprofit service providers, 
who are required to provide a funding match. President Obama has also used the bully pulpit 
of the White House in newly aggressive ways to recruit philanthropic support for his campaign 
to assist young men of color, the My Brother’s Keeper initiative.45 
These partnerships are by definition public; there is a performative element in this intersection 
of philanthropy and politics, utilizing the high profile of government office as a means of 
recruiting additional donors to a cause. But there is also a subterranean intersection of politics 
and philanthropy as well, which in the last few decades has also deepened through the use of 
tax-exempt nonprofits - including 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, donor-advised funds, 
and business leagues - to channel philanthropic dollars to electoral politics anonymously. 
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Although donors have hid behind nonprofits to push policy in the past (as with the Du Pont 
family and the American Liberty League), the 1996 election witnessed the first occasion in 
which ‘‘a major corporation used a tax-exempt non-profit as a front-group’’ for political donation. 
Yet the flood of dark money flowing through the nonprofit sector to influence elections did not 
intensify until 2010, in part due to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Citizens United case, 
which allowed unlimited corporate donations to election campaigns. This enabled philanthropic 
dollars to influence elections not merely indirectly through think tanks, academic programs, 
and advocacy organizations but directly and with no donor disclosure via social welfare 
organizations. Money poured in, largely from the Right, targeting state assembly and judicial 
races, as well as national elections. In 2006, only 2 percent of outside political spending came 
from 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. By 2010, that number had climbed to 40 percent. 
In the 2016 election, the amount of dark money channeled through nonprofits has fallen from 
its 2012 level, but still will likely reach close to $150 million.46 
Given the surge in dark money, it is not surprising that suspicions regarding philanthropy’s 
engagement with politics have also intensified. Yet the more public partnerships between 
philanthropy and government have also stirred apprehensions. In fact, rising concerns about 
philanthropy’s possible subversion of democracy have closely tracked the sector’s recent turn 
toward policy advocacy. This is less a novel development than a return to roots - to the more 
censorious climate of the mid-1960s (and before that of the Progressive Era), but with the 
added amplification of the stimulant of mega-philanthropy. One anonymous historian made 
reference to how contemporary developments both echo and outpace precedents in the sector 
in a comment to education scholar Megan Tompkins-Stange. ‘‘Gates is strong-arming public 
policy in a way the Ford Foundation never would have thought of doing,’’ the source remarked. 
‘‘The Gates people make Mac Bundy look like a midget.’’47 Indeed, what seems most novel 
about the current moment is not the tension between philanthropy and democracy itself, but 
the convergence of forces accentuating that tension. Grantmakers have had to contend with 
budgetary retrenchment and diminished resources for discretionary public spending in the 
past, and their response has been to supplement government support and prop up institutions 
or organizations that might topple without it. There have also been periods before where 
governmental authority was held in relatively low regard - although the trough into which public 
opinion toward government has fallen now seems particular deep, hollowed out by political 
dysfunction and hyper-partisanship. But now the culture of fiscal austerity and the declining 
status of the public sector have been amplified by the growth of mega-fortunes and the 
celebration of the entrepreneur. These are the hallmarks of what its critics call ‘‘neo-liberalism’’ 
and they have given a significant boost to the forces of privatization, even if the resources at 
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the disposal of the state still vastly outweigh those available to private philanthropy. In the 
funding of scientific research and of public higher education, for instance, private philanthropy 
has increased significantly even as federal spending has stagnated or decreased. In a 2012 
paper, MIT’s Fiona Murray estimated that private philanthropic support of university-based 
scientific research has been growing at a rate of nearly 5 percent annually and represents 30 
percent of all university science funding. As the New York Times declared in a 2014 article, 
‘‘American science, long a source of national power and pride, is increasingly becoming a 
private enterprise.’’48 
 
8. Philanthropy and the Market: The Rise of Strategic Philanthropy  
As suggested above, the elevated status of entrepreneurship within the strategic and rhetorical 
arsenal of philanthropy is one of the defining elements of the last decade. But it is useful to 
think more broadly about how philanthropy has defined itself through and against the market 
over the last half century.  
From its origins at the turn of the last century, philanthropy has developed close ties with 
market forces and business practice. The philanthropic foundation borrowed much, for 
instance, from the organization of the industrial corporation, with its structures and procedures 
of rationalization and bureaucratization. The notion of stewardship that animated many donors 
of the period insisted that the talents and capabilities that produced a fortune should be applied 
toward its charitable redistribution - that good businessmen made good philanthropists. Grants 
were even occasionally referred to as investments. Yet the dominant metaphors that fueled 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era philanthropy were not primarily corporate or even capitalist - 
they were scientific and academic. Even more than Standard Oil or Carnegie Steel, the 
institution that the early foundations modeled themselves after was the German research 
university, with its commitment to disinterested, expert inquiry. The model helped to sustain 
the early foundations’ focus on public health and medical research. It was also attractive 
because foundations recruited so heavily from the ranks of university leadership. As Dwight 
Macdonald wrote in 1956, foundation leaders ‘‘have proved more responsive to the values…of 
the academic concerns on whose borders they operate than to those of the rich men who 
founded them.’’49 
In the last half century, however, the market has risen as a rival paradigm, surpassing scientific 
or academic norms as the dominant means of understanding philanthropic practice. This 
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market-based orientation has taken on many forms and assumed many names: from venture 
philanthropy to strategic philanthropy to philanthrocapitalism to social entrepreneurship to 
hacker philanthropy. There is considerable overlap between these categorizations, but there 
are also important distinctions between them, reflecting both the particular historical moments 
in which the labels developed and the dominant modes of industry, commerce, and 
accumulation that they modeled. There are many other terms whose history we do not consider 
below------in the time it has taken you to read this paragraph, it is likely a few more have been 
added to the philanthropic lexicon. This taxonomical profusion is itself a development worthy 
of consideration. For much of the century, ‘‘scientific’’ philanthropy sufficed as a concept to 
explain philanthropic practice. Then over the last few decades, the pace of the creation of new 
terms accelerated dramatically. It is difficult to determine whether this has been due to the fact 
that the actual pace of change within the sector has accelerated, whether the sector is now 
experiencing heightened self-consciousness, or whether the sector is simply more 
sophisticated at self-branding. Even if many of these buzzwords are ephemeral, collectively 
they point to a novel feature of the contemporary philanthropic landscape: the emergence of a 
constellation of journalists, researchers, and consultants scrutinizing the sector, seeking to 
make sense of its trends, to prod it to move in certain directions, and to profit from that analysis 
and advice. This expanding support industry has fostered a certain degree of faddishness. The 
identification of certain trends as novel and therefore as worthy of study or emulation has 
seemed a reliable way for grant-seekers to attract support from the foundations on whom they 
depend.  
Scientific philanthropy’s status as the dominant paradigm lasted well into the 1960s, with its 
emphasis on addressing root causes through disinterested research. But already, by the time 
that the Hewlett Foundation was established, a more corporate, enterprise-based mode of 
thinking was on the ascent. This reflected the composition of the sector’s leadership, which 
increasingly derived from the corporate sector. In the late 1960s, for instance, at the end of his 
life, Charles Mott brought in his grandson-in-law, who had experience as a management 
consultant, to apply the methodology of corporate planning to the foundation’s programming. 
By the 1970s and 1980s, the percentage of foundation staff hired from university positions had 
dropped by half; managerial expertise became especially valued, pushing aside the 
preeminence of the behavioral sciences as the background of choice for leadership positions. 
These trends continued and have even accelerated in the last two decades, culminating in 
2009 with Ford’s selection of Luis Ubiñas as its new president, who had previously served as 
a director of the consulting firm McKinsey & Company. In a 2011 article, legal scholar Garry 
Jenkins examined the professional backgrounds of the three largest private foundations for 
each of the last five decades. ‘‘[T]his is the first time in at least half a century,’’ he noted, ‘‘that 
37 
 
executives who spent the bulk of their careers in the for-profit sector have so dominated the 
top echelons of philanthropic foundation posts.’’50 
By the 1990s, as a self-consciously business orientation took hold of much of the philanthropic 
sector, it gained more theoretical and strategic coherence. It gained a semi-official designation: 
‘‘strategic philanthropy.’’ The key theoretician and evangel of strategic philanthropy was 
Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter; the article he wrote with Mark Kramer in the 
November 1999 Harvard Business Review, ‘‘Philanthropy’s New Agenda: Creating Value,’’ 
provided the movement’s clarion call. That Harvard Business School was now the locus for 
philanthropic innovation was itself an important testament to developments in the sector; since 
its first publication in 1922, the term ‘‘philanthropy’’ had not appeared in the journal’s titles till 
the 1990s, and the word itself had cropped up in only a little more than a dozen articles before 
the 1980s. But as Porter and Kramer made clear, business strategy offered philanthropy its 
best hope of achieving impact - which was the sole criteria for success. Too often, they wrote, 
foundations had invoked ‘‘strategic giving’’ to designate ‘‘almost any grant made with some 
purpose in mind.’’ In business, however, ‘‘a company’s strategy lays out how it will create value 
for its customers by serving a specific set of needs better than any of its competitors.’’ 
Foundations must begin to do the same. In order to earn the designation of ‘‘strategic,’’ they 
must operate like well-run corporations. Business enterprise had long served as a model for 
philanthropy, but the association between the two was now expressed even more concretely 
and instrumentally, the stuff of bullet-points and not merely casual metaphors. As Porter and 
Kramer made clear, a rupture was needed with past practice; by insisting on a ‘‘new agenda,’’ 
the authors were forging a link that would grow even more firm over the next decades between 
claims to historical novelty, the pursuit of philanthropic effectiveness, and the adoption of 
business models.51 
In subsequent elaborations, strategic philanthropy came to signify a set of emphases that were 
not necessarily novel in and of themselves, but were new in the rigor with which they were 
held. Paul Brest, perhaps the movement’s most articulate spokesman, defined it as an 
approach in which ‘‘donors seek to achieve clearly defined goals; where they and their 
grantees pursue evidence-based strategies for achieving those goals; and where both parties 
monitor progress toward outcomes and assess their success in achieving them in order to 
make appropriate course corrections.’’ Of course, the largest, most professional foundations 
have always sought to define goals, determine reasonable strategies to pursue them, and to 
monitor progress and assess success. An outcome orientation is nothing new. Piles of fading 
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mimeographed program reports in the Rockefeller Archive Center attest to this. Indeed, the 
whole idea of a ‘‘program area,’’ established by the first modern foundations, is a strategic 
notion of great importance. The programs of the early foundations were carefully thought-out 
in relation to their perceived inherent importance, to their prospects for success in 
implementation, and to their philanthropic opportunity cost (economic costs of research and 
implementation, situational analysis of the likelihood of other parties entering the program 
space, etc.). 
But strategic philanthropy has encouraged a few key tenets that have pushed the sector as a 
whole in new directions, attracting both new funders such as Michael Bloomberg and older 
ones such as the Rockefeller Foundation under Judith Rodin (though plenty of other funders 
have remained immune to it). The first is a donor-centric model of the grantee-grantor 
relationship. This has taken several shapes. Porter and Kramer, for instance, urged 
foundations to serve not merely as capital providers but as ‘‘fully engaged partners…improving 
the grantee’s effectiveness as an organization.’’ The key assumption here is that funders had, 
or should cultivate, key insights into that effectiveness; they were to take on something of the 
role of management consultants for the sector and not defer to the assessments of their 
grantees. Taken a step further, strategic philanthropy has led many foundations to take the 
initiative in the grantmaking process. In the mid-1980s, Waldemar Nielsen could express 
concern that too many foundations were ‘‘reactive’’ and instead of identifying ‘‘needs not yet 
perceived,’’ merely responded to ‘‘the felt needs of others.’’ But in recent decades, in part 
through the promptings of strategic philanthropy (and perhaps as well due to the rise in more 
engaged living donors), a more proactive class of funder has emerged that sets very specific 
agendas, identifies preferred approaches, and then identifies grantees who can implement 
them.52 
Garry Jenkins has identified several metrics that point to this shift toward donor-centrism (he 
refers to this development in terms of philanthrocapitalism, but it more accurately describes 
the tangle of approaches associated with strategic philanthropy). First, he notes foundations 
are devoting proportionally more resources to larger projects (as discussed above). Second, 
‘‘they are asserting more control over the use of the grant funds they disperse through the use 
of limited-purpose grants,’’ noting a rise in the dollar allocation to grants for program support 
from 2003 to 2008. Third, foundations ‘‘are becoming increasingly closed to the ideas and 
innovations proposed by nonprofit organizations operating on the ground.’’ He locates this 
development in the increase in closed and semi-closed grant-proposal policies. According to 
Foundation Center data, in 1994, just 6 percent of all large foundations had an invitation-only 
grant policy. ‘‘By 2008,’’ Jenkins writes, ‘‘that percentage had increased to 29%.’’ In 1994, only 
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10 percent of the foundations included in Jenkins’ sample ‘‘had adopted a proactive 
grantmaking style in which they declined to consider unsolicited proposals.’’ By 2008, 48 
percent of the ‘‘independent and corporate foundations sampled reported that their 
grantmaking was overwhelmingly foundation initiated.’’53 
Jenkins speculates that the rise in targeted giving was linked to an increased emphasis within 
the sector on the measurement of impact - since project-based grants provided a more 
circumscribed sphere for assessment. This is another hallmark of strategic philanthropy: the 
premium placed on rigorous and frequent evaluation and measurement of grantees. This is 
not to say that foundations in the past showed little interest in determining their impact, in either 
qualitative or quantitative terms. Far from it; as early as 1959, the public intellectual Jacques 
Barzun chastised foundations for being over-impressed by the measurable. But the close 
monitoring of grantees, the staking of a tight ‘‘evidence-based’’ tether, is a relatively new 
phenomenon. It required the development of formal program evaluation, which received its 
initial boost from the governmental programs of the 1960s. ‘‘Great Society legislation,’’ 
historian Peter Dobkin Hall has written, ‘‘both required and provided funding for evaluation.’’ 
Government contracting to nonprofits for social service provision, and the oversight it entailed, 
brought about increased levels of reporting and assessment. At the same time, in the wake of 
the congressional investigations of foundations, sector leaders hoped that evaluations, shared 
with the public, might ‘‘help reduce some of the mystery from foundation activities,’’ in the 
words of the Peterson Commission. So at the time of the Hewlett Foundation’s establishment, 
the sector was primed to take evaluation seriously. 
In 1981, one researcher determined that of the largest 450 foundations, 76 had awarded 
evaluation grants of some kind. Some funders, with the Robert Wood Johnson and Wallace 
foundations as prime examples, made sophisticated use of program evaluations. But more 
generally throughout the sector, evaluative techniques remained relatively modest and beset 
by concerns about the limitations of evaluation itself. However, as Hall noted, the 1990s 
witnessed a significant jump in the use of evaluation within the nonprofit sector. He attributed 
it to many possible causes: improvements in evaluative technique, based on advances in the 
social and behavioral sciences; the increased professionalization of the nonprofit sector; the 
growing prominence of staff and leaders who were trained in business schools and schools of 
public administration, where evaluation had become part of the curriculum. Hall also mentioned 
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the expansion of the sector and the advent of a new donor class, spurred by growth in 
technology and finance, with strict demands of accountability for their giving.54 
The ascendance of a business management-trained class, and of management-based theory, 
within the philanthropic sector has perhaps been most significant to the rise of strategic 
philanthropy, for it encouraged foundations and donors to regard philanthropic interventions in 
terms of carefully-calibrated investments. In this sense, evaluation was not simply applied 
retrospectively to understand a program’s impact and to inform future philanthropic practice; 
nor was it a public relations instrument, to educate the public about the contributions of 
philanthropy. Strategic philanthropy has helped to incorporate evaluation into the grantmaking 
process itself, with outcomes defined in terms of closely monitored ‘‘deliverables’’ and frequent 
benchmarking of performance metrics.  
More subtly, the maturation of the evaluation field, and its development through the doctrines 
of strategic philanthropy, has boosted the technocratic strains within the sector. Advances in 
data technology and the spread of an engineering ethos within key parts of the sector have 
also bolstered this technocratic orientation. Together, these developments have transformed 
philanthropy’s basic epistemology. The impulse toward evidence-based quantitative 
assessment can channel philanthropic interventions in certain directions, since ideas regarding 
what can be accurately measured can shape beliefs about what should be funded. Critics of 
strategic philanthropy have argued that it has eschewed ‘‘messier,’’ movement-based causes 
in favor of ‘‘neater,’’ more clearly delineated programs and initiatives, in which a causal link 
could be firmly forged between the philanthropic intervention and the desired outcome. Among 
some strategic grantmakers this approach has also produced a preference for shorter time 
frames for the accomplishment of programmatic goals. Megan Tompkins-Stange, for instance, 
writes that the Broad Foundation expects to see improvements in student achievement scores 
within one year of investing in a school. There is, however, some evidence that the pendulum 
has begun to swing back away from a reliance on such strict performance metrics to more 
qualitative modes of assessments. In that case, it is possible that the short-term outcome 
orientation in the sector will itself have had a relatively short term.55 
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9. New Entrepreneurial Variants: Venture Philanthropy and 
Philanthrocapitalism  
If strategic philanthropy reflects the influence of management consultants on the sector, a 
variant or close relative - ‘‘venture philanthropy’’ - represents the viewpoints of venture 
capitalists. The first stirrings of venture philanthropy - or at least the first pairings of those words 
- occurred a decade or so after the mid-century development of venture capitalism itself. But it 
was in the 1990s that the idea took on more formal coherence, aided, as with strategic 
philanthropy, by an article in the Harvard Business Review. ‘‘Virtuous Capital: What 
Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists,’’ was written by Christine Letts, William 
Ryan, and Allen Grossman - who are, respectively, the founder of a program in nonprofit policy 
at Harvard’s Kennedy School, a nonprofit and foundation consultant, and a professor of 
management practice at Harvard Business School.  
Their proposal, as actualized by later practitioners, resembled strategic philanthropy in many 
respects: the specification short-term goals, the creation of funder partnerships with donees 
based on conditional provision of funding and dependent upon the achievement of previously 
agreed-upon, quantitatively evaluated outcomes. Venture philanthropy emphasized seeking 
out grantees as opposed to issuing open calls for proposals and conducting extensive due 
diligence prior to investment to ensure a promising return on investment. It was also 
distinguished from strategic philanthropy in its emphasis on provisional, short-term 
relationships between grantee and grantor, and in its insistence on an even more strenuous 
implementation of that partnership, with funders frequently taking board seats in the 
organizations they support and withdrawing if benchmarks are not met. Maintaining a sound 
‘‘exit strategy’’ became an important element of the approach. Venture philanthropy has also 
emphasized assisting grantee organizations relatively early in their development, providing 
capital that would allow them to grow to scale. Perhaps its most striking element, and one that 
has attracted funders who do not explicitly align themselves with the movement (such as a 
new corps of ‘‘hacker philanthropists’’), is its propensity for risk-taking. Like venture capitalists 
themselves, who might fund scores of start-ups in search of one ‘‘unicorn,’’ venture 
philanthropists were not afraid of failure. They would take ‘‘big bets’’ on grantees whose 
programs might have low probabilities of success but enormous social impact if successful. 
This talk of riskiness would have mystified funders from a half century ago. First, they would 
have feared it would threaten to topple the bulwarks of legitimacy that they had constructed in 
light of public censure and philanthropy’s declining status relative to the corporate and public 
sectors. Also, because their conception of philanthropic support was frequently so open-
ended, long-term, and fluid, they would have found it difficult to arrive at definitive judgments 
of success or failure over a few grant cycles. The comfort many funders now have with the 
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incorporation of failure into the grantmaking process is another sign of how entrenched an 
entrepreneurial mindset has become in the sector over the last few decades.56 
In fact, one of the most important new developments within the sector has been the way in 
which the entrepreneurial mindset has weakened traditional divides between philanthropy and 
for-profit enterprise. In the past half century, there has been regular, steady traffic between the 
two realms, allowing borrowing and exchanges of personnel, metaphors, and occasionally 
techniques, but the demarcations between them have remained relatively coherent. Those 
boundaries likely constrained some creative thinking about philanthropic practice, but they also 
upheld norms. Now we are experiencing something more like open borders between the 
sectors.  
This phenomenon is sometimes classified as ‘‘philanthrocapitalism,’’ after a neologism coined 
by two journalists, Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, in a 2008 book. They use the term so 
expansively, however, that it loses much of its ability to identify its novel elements. Bishop and 
Green distinguish between philanthropists confronting social programs in a ‘‘businesslike way’’ 
and with ‘‘for-profit business models.’’ Both define philanthrocapitalism for them. The first form 
the authors describe as ‘‘the sense of a serious focus on results; understanding where to use 
scarce resources to have the greatest impact through leverage; a determination to quickly 
scale up solutions that work and a toughness in shutting down those that do not; backing 
entrepreneurial, innovative approaches to problems; forming partnerships with whoever will 
get the job done soonest and best; and taking big risks in the hope of achieving outsize impact.’’ 
Over the last half century, countless funders have demonstrated these characteristics. But the 
increased employment of ‘‘for-profit business models’’ can stake some claim to novelty. The 
idea of ‘‘blended’’ or ‘‘shared’’ value, the simultaneous pursuit of financial and social objectives, 
was pushed by Michael Porter in the 1990s. A related set of motivations animated a movement 
on behalf of ‘‘social entrepreneurship,’’ a term and approach popularized in the 1980s and 
1990s by Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka, an organization that supports social 
entrepreneurs. Much like philanthrocapitalism, social entrepreneurship carries with it a sense 
of breaking from traditional practice while at the same time fulfilling deep historical precedents; 
its proponents have included Florence Nightingale and Gandhi as forerunners, for example. 
All these conceptualizations communicate the belief that the market can be tapped as a force 
for social good. The belief itself is not new - see, for instance, Adam Smith on the benevolence 
of the baker, or later, John D. Rockefeller’s claim that his greatest philanthropy was the 
employment he provided to thousands through Standard Oil. But the strategies and tools being 
developed in light of that belief have triggered a new and powerful sense of possibility about 
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the performance and definition of philanthropy. The extent to which that possibility will be 
actualized in a meaningfully novel way is still very much an open question.57 
Here we only wish to point to the variety and range of approaches that have expanded the 
boundaries and challenged the traditional practice of the sector, without offering anything like 
a comprehensive inventory. Lester Salamon, in an introduction to a volume on ‘‘New Frontiers 
of Philanthropy,’’ describes these elements as moving the sector ‘‘beyond grants’’ (as with loan 
guarantees and social-impact bonds), ‘‘beyond foundations’’ (capital aggregators and social 
stock exchanges, for instance), ‘‘beyond bequests’’ (or beyond the gifts of wealth individuals, 
as with the formation of ‘‘social-purpose capital pools…[through the] privatization of formerly 
public or quasi-public assets’’), and ‘‘beyond cash’’ (as with the possibilities for barter 
arrangements allowed by the internet).58 
It is an impressive list. But it does not entirely settle the question of novelty. Take, for instance, 
the case of social impact investing. Its roots go back at least to the 1960s, with experiments at 
the Ford Foundation and Taconic Foundation with what were then termed program-related 
investments (PRIs), loaning funds to minority businesses in low-income urban areas. Although, 
as historian Olivier Zunz has pointed out, there were ‘‘precedents of philanthropic investments 
in poor neighborhoods’’ at the turn of the century, the embrace of PRIs required a 
reconceptualization of the grantmaking foundation’s place in the philanthropic landscape, 
‘‘laying aside the stricture of maximum return on investments in order to endow risky projects 
with social potential.’’ Soon the idea caught on with a number of other funders and over the 
next decades some of the largest foundations, including Carnegie, MacArthur, Rockefeller and 
Packard, invested hundreds of millions of dollars in PRIs. In recent years, a handful of funders 
have pushed the practice even further; they are led by the Heron Foundation, which has 
committed all of its endowment to investments that align with its mission. The promise of social 
impact investing, and of the erosion of the lines dividing investment and grantmaking 
components of a foundation, have generated considerable excitement and have even 
prompted the IRS recently to issue rules on ‘‘jeopardizing investments’’ that might allay the 
concerns of some foundation investment officers and encourage the practice further. 
But the prevalence of impact investing within the sector is still modest and its potential to 
reshape the practice of philanthropy remains entirely notional. A 2015 survey by the Center for 
Effective Philanthropy of 73 foundation CEOs found that only 2 percent of total endowment 
funds were directed to impact investing. A 2016 survey by the Council on Foundations and the 
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Commonfund Institute found that 16 percent of foundations were engaged in impact investing. 
The authors of the survey note the large number of respondents who seem unsure about their 
foundation’s current policy, or who remain undecided on the issue. Such results show, they 
conclude, ‘‘the extreme fluidity of the current dialogue about responsible investing.’’ It is that 
fluidity, rather than any definite sector-wide shifts in conventions or practice, that seems the 
most novel characteristic of the current moment.59 
A similar argument can be made on behalf of the utilization of limited liability corporations or 
for-profit corporations as philanthropic vehicles. Pierre Omidyar and Jeff Skoll, the founders of 
eBay, provided early precedents in this approach, as did Google. The Omidyar Network, for 
instance, was established as an LLC, what Omidyar termed a ‘‘philanthropic investment firm,’’ 
with much of its early work focused on supporting microfinance, then the social enterprise 
cause célèbre. Most recently, Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan have pledged to 
donate 99 percent of their Facebook shares, valued at $45 billion, to an LLC, the Chan 
Zuckerberg Initiative. Explaining their decision, the couple mentioned the importance of 
keeping their options open: the LLC would allow them to use their philanthropic resources to 
make contributions to nonprofit organizations, to make for-profit investments, or make political 
contributions. Some considered the announcement an augur of a wholesale transformation of 
the sector, sounding the death knell for the traditional philanthropic foundation. But, as of yet, 
there is no evidence that the practice has caught on beyond a small minority of Silicon Valley 
funders. And though Zuckerberg and Chan have made a few for-profit investments through 
their LLC, these have been definitely modest in scale, and incommensurate with the 
momentousness that met news of the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative.  
The prominence of these entrepreneurs has certainly helped to promote a sense of possibility 
regarding philanthropic practice and furthered the erosion of stable reference points within the 
sector. But from the perspective of a half century, it is too soon to determine how those 
possibilities will congeal and how settled the new frontiers of philanthropy will become. A recent 
headline in the Chronicle of Philanthropy describing the consensus at the last Council of 
Foundations annual conference describes this ambiguity: ‘‘Despite New Ways of Giving, Grant 
Makers Say No Big Shift Is Afoot.’’ Yet the Chronicle noted that the panel that prompted the 
article, on ‘‘Philanthropy Outside the Tax-Exempt Model,’’ was standing room only.60 
 
 
                                                          
59 Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 218-220; Steven Rathgeb Smith, ‘‘Foundations and Public Policy,’’ in Anheier and 
Hammack, American Foundations: Roles and Contributions, 378; Chronicle of Philanthropy, May 12, 2016; Phil 
Buchanan, Jennifer Glickman, and Ellie Buteau, ‘‘Investing and Social Impact: Practices of Private Foundations’’ 
(Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2015); Council on Foundations-Commonfund Study of Responsible Investing, 
Foundations Survey 2016, accessed online at http://www.issuelab.org/resources/25231/25231.pdf.   
60 Bishop and Green, Philanthrocapitalism, 116-120; Alex Daniels and Rebecca Koenig, ‘‘Despite New Ways of 
Giving, Grant Makers Say No Big Shift Is Afoot,’’ Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 11, 2016.   
45 
 
10. Sector-Wide Structures, Identity, and Knowledge  
One reason for the current pronounced sense of the sector’s organizational fluidity is because 
for much of the last century, the sector’s basic institutional form remained so constant. During 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, a group of industrialists and financiers confronting the 
challenge of disbursing parts of their massive fortunes toward philanthropic ends, hit on a novel 
strategy: the general-purpose, grantmaking private foundation. This new model, based on 
trustee policymaking, foundation employment of well-educated (but normally not expert) 
professional staff, and grantmaking became the norm of foundation organization by the mid-
1920s and has remained the most common form of philanthropic organization to this day. It 
was the form that John D. Rockefeller selected, as well as William Hewlett in the 1960s and 
Bill Gates in the 1990s. This stasis may be an argument for the validity of the DiMaggio-Powell 
concept of institutional isomorphism in organizational structure - that over time organizations 
of the same type tend to take on similar organizational forms. But it also highlights that what 
has changed most dramatically over the last half century is not philanthropic form but 
objectives, strategies, and procedures.61 
A half century ago, with congressional deliberations over the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the 
private grantmaking foundation received its most significant challenge. It survived, though 
there was some evidence that the regulations imposed encouraged charitable dollars to flow 
toward alternative sources, such as directly to public charities. We are now witnessing another 
challenge to the predominance of the private foundation, as institutionalized over the last 
century. This time, however, charitable funds are not being pushed out by regulatory 
disincentives so much as pulled in other directions by new opportunities and institutional 
models.62 
The most dramatic transformation of the institutional landscape has been produced by the 
meteoric rise of donor-advised funds (DAFs). DAFs are themselves not new; they were first 
established in the early 1930s, ‘‘when some community foundations began allowing high-end 
donors to maintain ongoing advisory privileges for their donations, rather than requiring all gifts 
to go to the community foundation’s unrestricted funds.’’ Over the next half century, they 
spread modestly, confined largely to community foundations. Their real explosion came with 
the advent of commercial DAFs. Fidelity Investments created the first of these, Fidelity 
Charitable, in 1991 and other investment firms quickly followed suit. Given the administrative 
and tax benefits they offered donors (especially large donors), DAFs spread like wildfire over 
the next two decades. According to a 2014 report, there are more than 238,000 of them at 
supporting organizations across the United States, nearly three times the number of private 
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foundations. The assets directed to DAFs are growing equally fast, with total assets of more 
than $70 billion. Annual contributions to donor-advised funds have surged from $5 billion in 
2008 to $14.2 billion in 2013, according to the Chronicle of Philanthropy. This year, for the first 
time in a quarter century, a DAF (Fidelity Charitable) sits atop the Chronicle of Philanthropy’s 
list of the 400 U.S. charities that have brought in the most private funds each year (it displaced 
the United Way, which had assumed that spot every year, except for one). Fidelity raised $4.6 
billion, an increase of 20 percent from the year before; three other commercial DAFs, from 
Schwab (no. 4), Vanguard (no. 11), and the National Philanthropic Trust (no. 17), were also 
ranked in the top 20, while the Silicon Valley Community Foundation, which received nearly all 
of its donations through DAFs, came in 10th. The Chronicle estimates that the amount of 
charitable giving being directed to DAFs could now be as high as 10 percent.63 
This dramatic upheaval in the philanthropic landscape both reflects and fosters the spirit of 
open-endedness and choice that characterizes a sector that now can claim no stable normative 
center. It represents as well the culmination of many different historical trends, especially when 
considered from the perspective of half a century: the growth of intermediary organizations; 
the widening gap between the charities supported by the wealthy and those supported by the 
middle and lower classes; a push-back against the demands of transparency; the spread of a 
donor-centric ethos and the declining faith in large bureaucracies.64 This development also 
complicates the categorization of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the most powerful 
foundation of this generation, within the narrative of the sector’s growth over the last half 
century. In one sense, the Gates Foundation represents the model of the large, bureaucratic, 
and hierarchical foundation, the inheritor of an institutional legacy passed down from 
Rockefeller to Ford. It now has more than 1,375 employees in eight offices across the world. 
But, as Megan Tompkins-Stange has recently pointed out, this was not Gates’ original vision. 
He was ‘‘initially committed to maintaining a lean organizational structure, maintaining a 
relatively small staff and relying on external partnerships with intermediaries to manage 
grantees.’’ But the infusion of enormous capital gifts from Warren Buffett required a massive 
expansion of the foundation, demonstrating the power of size to overwhelm organizational 
theory or style.65 
This places the Gates Foundation outside the current movement, especially prominent among 
some of the high tech and finance philanthropists, to favor leaner foundations. Business 
success has often pushed them in this direction: As Inside Philanthropy’s David Callahan has 
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pointed out, many of today’s wealthiest Americans have presided over companies ‘‘that are 
extremely lean relative to their revenues and market valuation.’’ Additionally, the donor-centric, 
entrepreneurial mindset dominant within the sector now also carries with it an anti-bureaucratic 
bias. As hedge-fund investor Bill Ackman told Callahan, explaining why he has resisted 
constructing a large infrastructure around his Pershing Square Foundation, ‘‘I don’t think 
overhead is particularly productive.’’ Many Silicon Valley philanthropists seek to emulate the 
start-up culture that had fueled their entrepreneurship, maintaining organizational nimbleness 
through relatively small staff and a reliance on advisers and intermediaries, so that their 
philanthropy can remain ‘‘disruptive.’’ 
Finally, within certain high-profile quadrants of the sector, the popularity of an ethic of ‘‘Giving 
While Living’’ and, relatedly, of limited life philanthropy, has risen. Mark Zuckerberg and 
Priscilla Chan, for instance, have pledged to spend the Facebook fortune they have committed 
to philanthropy ‘‘during our lives.’’ Bill and Melinda Gates have stipulated that their foundation 
will terminate 20 years after their deaths. These developments suggest a weakening, if not an 
absolute abolition of the presumption of perpetuity that has governed the sector for most of the 
last half century and that seeded it with foundations that have continued to grow long after their 
donors had passed from the scene.66 
The preference for smaller, leaner foundations in no way betrays a lack of dedication to the 
craft of philanthropy, which points to a significant difference from the sector as it existed a half 
century ago. Then, many of the larger foundations were under-staffed not by design but by 
default, through a sort of bureaucratic immaturity. In Nielsen’s survey of the largest foundations 
in the late 1960s, he determined that a quarter employed no full-time staff, operating only with 
an accountant or a secretary. A researcher a few years later offered another tally, writing that 
‘‘the great majority of foundations…still operate without any professional staff at all. Only 212 
American foundations (about one per cent) employ any full-time officer, and of the total of 1,062 
full-time foundation administrators, twenty-five per cent are employed by Ford and fifteen per 
cent by Rockefeller.’’67 
In the following decades, the more rigorous and extensive hiring practices that had presided 
at Ford, Rockefeller, and a handful of other foundation spread more widely throughout the 
sector (it was in 1977, for instance, that William Hewlett brought on a full-time president, Roger 
Heyns, the former chancellor of Berkeley, to systematize and expand his foundation’s 
grantmaking). The process is sometimes described as ‘‘professionalization,’’ but this term 
implies standards and training, along with certification of competence in professional 
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knowledge, which the sector has had little interest in or aptitude for cultivating (only recently 
did the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
offer the first advanced degrees in philanthropy studies). The trend more closely approximates 
a sort of self-conscious and self-confident bureaucratic maturation. As Peter Frumkin has 
written, ‘‘Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, foundations clearly began to recognize 
philanthropic expertise as a qualification for foundation work and to seek it out.’’ Many 
foundations, he notes, began to place a premium on hiring staff and executive directors with 
previous professional experience in philanthropy - as opposed to veterans of higher education 
or government service. By the mid-1990s, according to a survey from the Council on 
Foundations, nearly 80 percent of foundations had a paid staff, and 55 percent had a paid 
professional staff. As Frumkin points out, these shifting hiring patterns had significant 
repercussions within the sector, depersonalizing the grantmaking process (the relationship 
between foundation trustee and grantee was no longer the key determinant of success), 
leading more foundations toward restricted-purpose project grants, and placing higher 
evaluative demands on grantees.68 
The increased bureaucratization of the sector was largely a response to the push for greater 
transparency and accountability brought on by the deliberations over and the passage of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969. It is difficult to overstate the opacity that characterized much of the 
sector before 1969. Since the early 1940s, the federal government had required some basic 
annual reporting from all tax-exempt nonprofits, foundations included, through Form 990-PF, 
but a great number of foundations resisted or complied with only a bare minimum of effort, and 
the information that was collected was not available for public examination. The vast majority 
of foundations preferred to operate in cocoons of privacy, from which they would emerge to 
utter occasional platitudes about the good work they were performing and the importance of 
voluntarism in American life. In his 1956 work, philanthropy researcher F. Emerson Andrews 
concluded that only 76 out of the 15,000 foundations that existed published annual or biennial 
reports. In 1968, the Foundation Center determined that only about a third of the 261 
foundations with assets of more than $10 million did so. About a third of the largest foundations 
that Waldemar Nielsen surveyed in his 1972 book only began to issue reports to the public 
after they were required to do so by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.69 Indeed, beyond the 
regulatory requirements, the panic among sector leaders provoked by congressional action in 
1969 convinced many of them of the need to communicate more effectively the significance, 
legitimacy, and importance of foundations to the public. ‘‘[T] he past fifteen years,’’ declared 
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Waldemar Nielsen in 1985, ‘‘have been a period of extraordinary development in foundation 
communications.’’ Later, internet-based technological advances gave communications 
another boost. Many foundations now offer frequently updated online grant databases, along 
with well-crafted reports, blog posts, and interviews with the press that provide information on 
their programs, strategic orientation, and grantmaking processes. Increased reporting 
demands from the government have also enhanced information about foundation behavior. 
Changes in Form 990-PF made in 2007, for instance, required increased disclosure of 
information on corporate governance and boards of governors, as well as increased financial 
reporting for large organizations (over $1 million in revenues or $2.5 million in net assets).70  
As with diversity, the growth of transparency as a sector-wide imperative has underscored the 
inadequacy of its current status. Once there was a standard, its proponents could be 
disappointed by its imperfect actualization. But we should also be careful not to assume any 
sort of inherent teleological imperative toward greater transparency within the sector. In fact, 
in the last decade we have witnessed reverses in the sector’s commitment to transparency. 
The spread of donor-advised-funds (and, to a lesser extent, of limited-liability corporations) 
has been motivated in part by donors’ desire for greater discretion and privacy in their giving 
choices. Some of the mega-foundations that have emerged in recent years have established 
only a modest web presence, and share little information with the public. The perspective of 
50 years helps reveal the non-linear nature of much development within the sector; past 
movement in a particular direction does not guarantee future movement.71 
The last few decades have also witnessed a transformation in the culture of giving among 
individual donors that paralleled the institutional move toward greater transparency. It also 
echoed the efforts of an earlier generation of philanthropists, led by Andrew Carnegie and 
Julius Rosenwald, who at the turn of the last century promoted the idea of philanthropy as a 
fundamentally public vocation. Both men wrote popular tracts outlining their theories of giving 
and urging their fellow millionaires to think carefully about how best to commit their fortunes to 
good ends. This tradition faced off against, and was largely overwhelmed by, another that 
emphasized discretion and privacy in giving. The second tradition had several sources: a 
Christian ethic of humility (the right hand not knowing what the left was doing); the desire of 
donors to shield themselves from the flood of solicitations that usually followed the 
announcement of a major gift; the belief that demands for public disclosure and information 
regarding philanthropy gifts were an affront to the prerogatives of private property. When, for 
instance, J. Howard Pew, the oil magnate, was asked in the late 1960s why his foundation had 
never issued a single report to the public, he shouted, ‘‘I’m not telling anybody anything. It’s 
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my money, isn’t it!’’ Many of the major donors of the middle decades of the century felt similarly, 
even if they expressed themselves more tactfully. Many, including William Hewlett, preferred 
to operate out of the glare of public attention; and if most did not insist on strict anonymity and 
reject scrutiny entirely, they did tend to eschew publicity.  
But by the final decades of the century, a more public, even performative attitude toward 
philanthropy had begun to take root. Its growth can be traced to a multitude of related causes: 
the general celebration of wealth in the culture; the development of media with a particular 
focus on the richest Americans; the development of a competitive ethic among the wealthy 
regarding their giving, spurred on by giving lists that document the most generous gifts and 
donors (which spread in the 1990s); the convergence of philanthropy, business, and politics in 
the public convenings of the global elite (Davos and its progeny). There has also been 
increased interest in the employment of gift announcements and the reputational capital of 
philanthropists as instruments of leverage, which can encourage greater giving by others. As 
one philanthropy researcher recently told Forbes, ‘‘We’re seeing more givers who were 
formerly donating anonymously now willing to give openly as a way to inspire others to follow 
their lead.’’ Atlantic Philanthropy’s Chuck Feeney is the most significant exemplar of this trend. 
This logic has also motivated the Giving Pledge, the campaign led by Bill and Melinda Gates 
and Warren Buffett to convince billionaires to commit more than half their wealth to 
philanthropy (it now has 156 signatories from 16 countries). One of the stipulations of the 
pledge is that signatories compose a personal testimonial about their giving that is published 
on the pledge’s website. ‘‘The goal,’’ the site announces, ‘‘is to talk more about giving in an 
open way and create an atmosphere that can draw more people into philanthropy.’’72 
The Giving Pledge reflects another trend in the sector: the consolidation of a tighter 
philanthropic community, or rather, philanthropy communities. Other networks of donors, such 
as the Global Philanthropists Circle, preceded the Giving Pledge and still others, catering to 
different segments of the sector, such as Resource Generation, have emerged recently as 
well. So have more organized donor affinity groups and regional associations. Perhaps even 
more significant, the sector has also developed distinct advocacy organizations that have 
promoted the interests of nonprofits and foundations and fostered a more cohesive sector-
wide identity. Nationwide sectoral organizations in the field of philanthropy first began to 
develop at mid-century. In 1949, the National Committee on Foundations and Trusts for 
Community Welfare in Chicago was established. The organization moved to New York in 1957 
and changed its name to the National Council on Community Foundations, and it soon 
broadened its mandate by permitting private and corporate foundations to join the organization. 
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The Rockefeller and Ford foundations supported this effort to represent the grantmaking field 
as a whole, and the organization took its present form and name, the Council on Foundations, 
in 1964.73 
The 1969 Tax Reform Act and the regulatory regime it inaugurated prompted foundations to 
develop more sophisticated defenses of their collective interests, which they did through the 
council, and to take modest steps toward self-regulation. It also led to the creation of 
Independent Sector in 1980, a new sectoral organization meant to represent both grantmaking 
and nonprofit service-delivering organizations. Then the Philanthropy Roundtable was created 
in 1987, an outgrowth of an early network of politically conservative funders, and intended to 
provide representation for grantmakers who felt themselves out of the liberal (as they perceived 
it) mainstream of the field. Other organizations, like the National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy (NCRP), created in 1976 out of the Donee Group within the Filer Commission, 
have sought to represent progressive critiques of the field. All of these organizations have 
significantly increased the level of discussion, debate, and analysis within the sector from a 
half century ago.74 
Indeed, at the time of the Hewlett Foundation’s establishment, knowledge about the 
philanthropic sector was strikingly meager. ‘‘The field of philanthropy was ignorant of the facts 
about itself,’’ wrote Waldemar Nielsen. ‘‘As a result, it was intellectually moribund.’’ There was 
only the most rudimentary base of research data on which to build analysis, largely through 
the effort of the Foundation Library Center, established in 1956 (later simply the Foundation 
Center), which began to publish an annual Foundation Directory in 1960. As a reaction to the 
hostile congressional investigations of foundations of the 1950s, the Ford Foundation became 
the first of the legacy foundations to support scholarship on philanthropy, identifying historian 
Merle Curti at the University of Wisconsin to lead a major research project. But these worthy 
efforts did not penetrate the consciousness of most foundation staff or leaders, who relied on 
less substantive modes of analysis. ‘‘In lieu of any effort to measure and examine the role of 
the huge private nonprofit sector in American life,’’ noted Nielsen, ‘‘a few paragraphs from 
Alexis de Tocqueville on the subject were endlessly repeated.’’ 
This complacency about the state of knowledge in the sector also changed in the wake of 
1969. The conflation of the ideas of ‘‘philanthropy’’ and ‘‘nonprofits’’ into a unitary social 
system, reflected in the establishment of Independent Sector and further encouraged by the 
shared experience of budgetary retrenchment during the Reagan administration, stimulated 
new kinds of institutional thinking about the role of the private non-business sector in creating 
social good. It is not surprising that new ideas and organizations devoted to researching 
philanthropy should have emerged at a time when the last gasps of the New Deal (and its 
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successor, the Great Society) were giving way to neo-liberalism, fostering a renewed emphasis 
on the dangers of statism and the benefits of the privatization of public power. Foundations 
also began pouring money into the construction of viable nonprofit sectors in countries around 
the world, most notably in the post-communist regions. Such efforts at democracy building 
soon extended to research into ‘‘civil society,’’ a category that came to subsume philanthropy 
for many researchers in the field. 
There really was no institutionalization of philanthropy research in the American academy prior 
to the late 1970s, apart from the important but relatively short-lived efforts of the Ford 
Foundation mentioned above. Several important efforts were initiated in the early 1970s. The 
Rockefellers supported the creation of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs (the Filer Commission), which published a report, Giving in America: Toward a Stronger 
Voluntary Sector, in 1975, along with a host of research papers it commissioned. At about the 
same time, Yale University initiated its Program on Nonprofit Organizations (PONPO), the first 
time a major university had risen to the challenge of identifying philanthropy and nonprofits as 
a primary research objective. Shortly thereafter, in the early 1980s, Independent Sector 
created a Research Committee under the leadership of Robert Payton, which helped to nurture 
a limited number of campus-based philanthropy research centers.75 
None of these centers emerged as a dominant site of intellectual authority, but the notion of 
philanthropy as a legitimate research field was gaining acceptance in the academy as well as 
in the professional field of philanthropy. The idea was supported by several crucial institutional 
developments. The first was the opening in 1975 of the Rockefeller Archive Center, the path-
breaking freestanding philanthropy archival organization, which at first housed and maintained 
only the records of Rockefeller organizations, but which over several decades expanded to 
become the leading national archive for foundation records, including those of the Ford 
Foundation. The next important developments were within the academic research community 
- the transformation of what is now the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations 
and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) and its journal, the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 
and the creation of the International Society for Third Sector Research and its journal, 
VOLUNTAS. These organizations - one transformed and revitalized and the other created by 
the newly self-conscious international scholarly community - provided both publication 
opportunities and scholarly legitimacy for the emergent field of philanthropy.  
Problems remained within the academy, however, since there was little consensus among 
those studying various aspects of philanthropy as to whether their work constituted an 
independent field of research, and because funding for philanthropy research was always 
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precarious. Yet it would no longer have been fair to call philanthropy ‘‘an intellectually 
moribund’’ enterprise. The last half century has produced a diverse and vigorous field of 
philanthropy research, featuring a good many campus-based (and several independent) 
research centers, a few academic journals dedicated to the publication of philanthropy 
research, multiple scholarly organizations dedicated to the field, and several academic 
disciplinary organizations that were receptive to philanthropy research. Much of this research 
has had a quantitative bias, but there have been important qualitative interventions as well. 
This surge in research has combined with the reporting of a number of non-academic 
publications focused on philanthropy and nonprofits, the offerings of watchdog groups such as 
the NCRP and consultancies with research arms such as Bridgespan and the Center for 
Effective Philanthropy, and the plentiful ruminations of sector insiders and outsiders on the 
blogosphere to cause an unprecedented intellectual ferment, fueling efforts at evaluation, 
criticism, historical reckoning, sociological assessment, and more.  
All these endeavors allow for a deeper, more nuanced historical investigation of philanthropy. 
They all help to achieve a more complex, sophisticated intuition of what is new in the sector. 
But they also help us to appreciate that the field has a long way to go in understanding its past, 
present, and future. They underscore how slippery an analytic category novelty can be. It’s a 
lesson we have come to learn over the course of the present project, even as we have done 
our best to locate the contemporary field of philanthropy in time. 
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